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WHY JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE FAILS 
Aziz Z. Huq 
ABSTRACT—Judicial independence seems under siege. President Trump 
condemns federal courts for their political bias; his erstwhile presidential 
opponents mull various court-packing plans; and courts, in turn, are 
lambasted for abandoning a long-held constitutional convention against 
institutional manipulation. At the same time, across varied lines of 
jurisprudence, the Roberts Court evinces a deep worry about judicial 
independence. This preoccupation with threats to judicial independence 
infuses recent opinions on administrative deference, bankruptcy, patent 
adjudication, and jurisdiction-stripping. Yet the Court has not offered a 
single, overarching definition of what it means by the term “judicial 
independence.” Nor has it explained how its disjointed doctrinal 
interventions add up to a coherent theory of institutional autonomy. And it 
remains unclear how debates on judicial independence among jurists relate 
to debates about the same term in the larger public sphere.  
 This Article’s first contribution is to analyze how the Roberts Court 
understands the term judicial independence and how its doctrinal rules fall 
far short of realizing even the aspirations the Court has for that term. This 
case study in doctrinal specification illuminates the gap between the Justices’ 
own ethical aspiration toward judicial independence and its institutional 
realization—a gap that generates confusion, uncertainty, and opportunities 
for circumvention. 
 This Article then abstracts away from the particulars of the Roberts 
Court’s jurisprudence to explore the origins of this aspiration–
implementation gap. To motivate this more general analysis, it first 
demonstrates that there is a large range of constitutional-design options for 
a founder seeking to create independent courts. The Framers of Article III 
embraced certain of these options and rejected others. Specifically, they 
preferred ex post to ex ante checks on political interference in the judiciary. 
Subsequent experience, though, has demonstrated that their choice of 
judicial independence’s institutional forms rested on flawed presuppositions. 
In particular, the Framers failed to anticipate the rise of partisanship as a 
motivating principle for national political action, and also the unexpectedly 
strong incentives that push legislatures toward vague or ambiguous statutory 
texts, leaving ample discretion for judges’ policy preferences. Today, it is 
possible to identify a range of instruments through which elected actors can 
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achieve such unraveling. The three most important can be labeled cracking, 
packing, and stacking by analogy to techniques of partisan gerrymandering. 
This taxonomical exercise illuminates how, in practice, the jurisprudence 
and politics of judicial independence fall so far short of professed ethical 
aspirations. This exercise further points toward the possibility of a more 
institutionally grounded account of what plausibly can be expected in terms 
of federal court autonomy from the partisan currents of American political 
life. 
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INTRODUCTION 
To judge from the polemics of the day, judicial independence is beset 
by enemies upon all sides. A perception of embattled precarity refracts 
through national political discourse and constitutional jurisprudence alike. 
From the White House streams a tweeted barrage of accusations alleging 
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rampant political bias and overreach among the federal judiciary1 and 
promising a “litmus test” for new Justices.2 The President’s nominees for the 
high Court, in turn, are condemned for their alleged “inability to be 
independent on any sort of issue salient to contemporary politics.”3 Some 
threaten that the Court will “pay the price” for its bad decisions.4 The 
Democratic presidential hopefuls of 2020, responding to such alarms, raced 
to outflank each other to the left, deploying a fusillade of proposals to 
“reform” the federal judiciary5—proposals that predictably worked as fuel 
for further outrage.6 The Chief Justice of the United States, for his part, has 
been left plaintively to repudiate the existence of “Obama judges or Trump 
judges,” and instead to extoll the “independent judiciary” as “something we 
 
 1 See, e.g., John Kruzel, Federal Judge Slams Trump’s Attacks on Judiciary, HILL (Nov. 7, 2019, 
4:13 PM), https://thehill.com/regulation/court-battles/469499-federal-judge-slams-trumps-attacks-on-
judiciary [https://perma.cc/UF9E-X5JY] (quoting Hon. Paul Friedman: “We are witnessing a chief 
executive who criticizes virtually every judicial decision that doesn’t go his way and denigrates judges 
who rule against him, sometimes in very personal terms . . . .”); Jeremy Diamond & Ariane de Vogue, 
Trump Rails Against 9th Circuit Court of Appeals in Wake of Asylum Ruling, CNN (Nov. 20, 2018, 5:02 
PM), https://www.cnn.com/2018/11/20/politics/donald-trump-9th-circuit-court-of-appeals/index.html 
[https://perma.cc/ZZ54-XW6S] (stating that President Trump called a Ninth Circuit asylum ruling “very 
unfair”); Kristine Phillips, All the Times Trump Personally Attacked Judges—And Why His Tirades Are 
‘Worse Than Wrong,’ WASH. POST (Apr. 26, 2017, 2:32 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
news/the-fix/wp/2017/04/26/all-the-times-trump-personally-attacked-judges-and-why-his-tirades-are-
worse-than-wrong/ [https://perma.cc/JG8Z-8WJK] (documenting Trump’s repeated criticism of the 
judiciary). Attacks on the judiciary also characterized Trump’s presidential campaign. Brent Kendall, 
Trump Calls on Ginsburg to Resign from Supreme Court, WALL ST. J. (July 13, 2016, 8:23 PM), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/trump-calls-on-ginsburg-to-resign-from-supreme-court-1468444857 
[https://perma.cc/GM6U-GW3D]. 
 2 Jeremy W. Peters, Trump’s New Judicial Litmus Test: Shrinking ‘the Administrative State,’ N.Y. 
TIMES (Mar. 26, 2018), https://nyti.ms/2DXp5n5 [https://perma.cc/3FFA-4ZS8]. 
 3 Roger Cohen, An Insidious and Contagious American Presidency, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 5, 2018), 
https://nyti.ms/2Cuy3Mz [https://perma.cc/Z9SE-77A3] (quoting University of Pennsylvania School of 
Law Professor Stephen Burbank). 
 4 Adam Liptak, John Roberts Condemns Schumer for Saying Justices ‘Will Pay the Price’ for ‘Awful 
Decisions,’ N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 4, 2020), https://nyti.ms/2TnkrK7 [https://perma.cc/7FNZ-MYNC] 
(quoting Sen. Chuck Schumer). 
 5 See, e.g., David A. Graham, The Democrats Discover the Supreme Court, ATLANTIC (June 4, 2019), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/06/buttigiegs-supreme-court-plan-and-democratic-
party/590905/ [https://perma.cc/2GYV-BX62] (describing Mayor Pete Buttigieg’s “[c]ourt-packing 
plan”); Restoring Trust in an Impartial and Ethical Judiciary, WARREN DEMOCRATS, 
https://elizabethwarren.com/plans/restore-trust [https://perma.cc/53QR-L72C] (proposing new recusal 
and conflict-of-interest rules).  
 6 See, e.g., Dan McLaughlin, Against the Democrats’ Court-Packing Scheme, NAT’L REV., (June 6, 
2019, 10:48 AM), https://www.nationalreview.com/magazine/2019/06/24/against-the-democrats-court-
packing-scheme/ [https://perma.cc/R8AC-JWZC] (“Court-packing is a Rubicon we should dread to 
cross.”). 
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should all be thankful for.”7 Times are so uncertain that even the ordinarily 
anodyne Year-End Report on the Federal Judiciary in 2019—a bureaucratic 
document that rarely attracts public attention—shifts gears midway to offer 
a lofty peroration celebrating the federal bench’s “duty to judge without fear 
or favor, deciding each matter with humility, integrity, and dispatch.”8 
Matters seem unequally unsettled and febrile when it comes to black-
letter federal courts doctrine. In a 2016 opinion, Chief Justice John Roberts 
warned of an unprecedented threat to the “bedrock rule of Article III.”9 Two 
years later, he again sounded an alarm that the judicial independence 
“necessary to secure individual freedom” was imperiled because Congress 
had “arrogate[d] the judicial power to itself.”10 In penning both of these 
writings, however, he was in dissent. The barbarians, if the Chief Justice is 
to be believed, were already within the gates. Nor do his warnings stand 
alone. In 2015, Justice Clarence Thomas sounded an alarm that one of the 
staple deference rules of administrative law, the doctrine of Chevron 
deference, threatened the “[i]ndependent judgment” of the federal bench, 
which was necessary “to decide cases in accordance with the law of the 
land.”11 A similar concern about other administrative law deference regimes 
would be seized upon four years later by Justice Neil Gorsuch. He expressed 
a strong objection to the prospect that the Court would “compromise our 
judicial independence and deny the people who come before us . . . impartial 
judgment.”12 Writing in a similar tenor but on a different aspect of 
administrative law, Justice Gorsuch later railed against a “retreat from the 
 
 7 Adam Liptak, Chief Justice Defends Judicial Independence After Trump Attacks ‘Obama Judge,’ 
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 21, 2018), https://nyti.ms/2DBp0sL [https://perma.cc/A7J7-MEGH]. Naturally, the 
President disagreed. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Nov. 21, 2018, 2:51 PM), 
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1065346909362143232 [https://perma.cc/D8ZU-YPYS]; 
Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Nov. 21, 2018, 3:09 PM), 
https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/1065351478347530241 [https://perma.cc/RHE9-NQ29]. 
 8 JOHN G. ROBERTS, JR., 2019 YEAR-END REPORT ON THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 4 (2019), 
https://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/year-end/2019year-endreport.pdf [https://perma.cc/9NBP-
6SSE].  
 9 Bank Markazi v. Peterson, 136 S. Ct. 1310, 1333 (2016) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“There has 
never been anything like [the challenged provision of federal law].”). 
 10 Patchak v. Zinke, 138 S. Ct. 897, 915 (2018) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 11 Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1218 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring in the 
judgment). 
 12 Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2439 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., concurring in the judgment). This 
concern about deference was prefigured by Justice Anthony Kennedy a decade earlier. Republic of 
Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 735 (2004) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“[J]udicial independence . . . is 
compromised by case-by-case, selective determinations of jurisdiction by the Executive.”). 
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promise of judicial independence.”13 Yet, like Chief Justice Roberts’s and 
Justice Thomas’s alarms, such concerns did not carry the day. Like Chief 
Justice Roberts’s intervention and Justice Thomas’s argument, Justice 
Gorsuch’s views were expressed in separate opinions that do not state the 
governing law. Indeed, heeding their call would force a dramatic recession 
from longstanding precedent. Whatever threats these Justices perceived to 
the principle of judicial independence were not persuasive to colleagues on 
the bench. The shadow over Article III persists. 
Across all these contemporary examples, the concept of judicial 
independence is used as a capacious linguistic vessel carrying an unruly 
tangle of political and principled anxieties. To be sure, the concept works 
differently in political and judicial discourses. For elected politicians, 
judicial independence is an unsettled and ambiguously defined concept. It is 
alternatively a notionally shared desideratum of public life weaponized 
against ideological opponents; a dangerous threat to vital policy agendas; or 
simply a hinderance to be ignored when promising voters durable policy 
achievements.14 In contrast to this vague and somewhat confusing rhetoric, 
the Justices have aimed at a relatively crisp and formal understanding of 
judicial independence. For the high Court’s Justices, the invocation of 
judicial independence is a way of capturing an “ethos”15 oriented toward 
ideals of legality, regularity, and the quarantine of politics from law. The 
judicial and political discourses of judicial independence, therefore, are not 
at all harmonious with each other. Yet the sharp divergences of views 
observed in both domains hint that even if judges and politicians alike rush 
to embrace judicial independence in the abstract, their agreement should not 
be taken at face value. Consensus at the level of abstract generalities instead 
is likely to obscure as much as it reveals.16 
 
 13 Oil States Energy Servs., LLC v. Greene’s Energy Grp., LLC, 138 S. Ct. 1365, 1380 (2018) 
(Gorsuch, J., dissenting). 
 14 Cf. Matthew Eshbaugh‐Soha & Paul M. Collins, Jr., Presidential Rhetoric and Supreme Court 
Decisions, 45 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 633, 637–40 (2015) (finding that presidents have tended to avoid 
speaking about pending Supreme Court cases but commented thereafter “to promote their reelection goals 
and historical legacies and to guide the direction of public policy”); Bethany Blackstone & Greg 
Goelzhauser, Presidential Rhetoric: Toward the Supreme Court, 97 JUDICATURE 179, 180 (2014) 
(positing a similarly expansive set of presidential goals when speaking to the Court). 
 15 PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION 126 (1982) 
(characterizing ethical arguments in constitutional law as “appeals to an ethos from which rules may be 
derived, whether they are embodied in the text or not”). 
 16 Commentators have long worried that “[w]hat is accepted as a definition of judicial independence 
is an occasional passing remark, a shrugging of the shoulders, a ‘You know what I mean.’” THEODORE 
L. BECKER, COMPARATIVE JUDICIAL POLITICS: THE POLITICAL FUNCTIONINGS OF COURTS 140 (1970). 
More recently, it has been suggested that “scholars have developed rigorous definitions of the concept.” 
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This Article hones in upon the judicial understanding of courts’ 
autonomy.17 It identifies and analyzes a large gap between the Court’s 
conception of judicial independence and the institutional conditions in which 
that concept is necessarily propounded. This Article’s core analytic claim is 
that there is a profound, unavoidable, and often unrecognized tension 
between judicial independence as an ethical aspiration and as an institutional 
dynamic. Judicial independence as glossed by the Court fails because it 
doesn’t navigate this divide effectively. That failure needs to be understood 
and evaluated in light of the overall structure and operation of the 
Constitution as a whole. The normative project here, in other words, is to 
situate the failure of judicial independence not in the local circumstances of 
the Trump presidency but rather as an outcome of institutional design 
choices that were made in 1787. 
To gain an initial purchase on the topic, this Article first offers a close 
reading of the Roberts Court’s efforts to distill the ethical aspiration of 
judicial independence into a stable doctrinal form. Even if one anticipates an 
unavoidable measure of incompleteness in the doctrinal specification of 
abstract constitutional ideas, the Roberts Court’s present jurisprudence of 
judicial independence presents concerns of a different magnitude. Its gaps, 
irrational discontinuities, and loopholes undermine, rather comprehensively, 
the Court’s purported project of advancing a coherent concept of judicial 
independence. To the contrary, the central normative justifications of judicial 
independence are at best haphazardly served and at worst undermined by 
extant doctrine in a way that calls out for explanation. 
To develop that explanation, this Article abstracts away from the 
Roberts Court’s idiosyncrasies and adopts a more general constitutional-
design perspective. In this second line of analysis, this Article argues that the 
disjunction between high constitutional aspiration and brute institutional 
circumstances in which judges and politicians interact arises not because of 
any failure of will or even for any malign or improper intention. Rather, it 
 
Michael D. Gilbert, Judicial Independence and Social Welfare, 112 MICH. L. REV. 575, 582 & n.29 
(2014) (collecting fifteen sources, each offering such a definition). But scholarly precision, especially 
when it is highly heterogenous, hardly vouchsafes political or professional agreement. 
 17 This is not to say that the political discourse does not raise worthy empirical and normative 
questions: Why, for example, should elected actors motivated generally by partisan concerns be so 
relentlessly worried about judicial independence? The latter has the character of what economists call a 
“public good,” which invites free riding and therefore tends to be underproduced. It is hence not the sort 
of selective benefit that politicians seem likely to dole out. At the same time, why—if politicians seem to 
so fervently embrace the ambition of judicial independence—are judges so acutely concerned about the 
same constitutional norm? Surely, avowed political commitment to judicial independence should mitigate 
the need for an Article III jurisprudence of prophylaxis. 
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emerges because judicial aspiration is an ideal that must be realized through 
concrete design choices. Different constitutional designers make different 
choices when institutionalizing judicial independence. Sometimes their 
choices pay off, and sometimes they fail. Within a fairly wide space of 
institutional-design possibilities, therefore, the Framers made “distinctive” 
and contingent choices18 about how to give the general concept of judicial 
independence a specific institutional form.  
Alas, the Framers’ specific choices were based on presuppositions that 
no longer hold. In consequence, the specific way in which judicial 
independence is institutionalized in the United States baked in critical 
vulnerabilities from the get-go. The current crises in both politics and 
doctrine shake out from these weaknesses. The Framers made pivotal 
assumptions about the constraining effect of federal statutory law on judicial 
discretion, the absence of partisan motives among elected-branch actors, and 
the relative strength of partisan motives and “institutional loyalties”19 within 
the federal government. Putting these assumptions together, we can see that 
the Framers viewed law as certain (and hence constraining) and the national 
government as capable of transcending factional politics. Time hasn’t treated 
these hopes kindly. Their failure creates contemporary opportunities for 
strategic action by the elected branches, largely via legitimate and well-
recognized constitutional channels, to undermine an independent judicial 
function.20 Judicial independence’s enemies, in other words, find their 
arsenal in the joints and ligaments of the Constitution’s very design. Its 
failure is a matter of original constitutional design—not a question of present 
infidelity.  
To give this point more specific bite, this Article maps three methods 
through which contemporary elected actors can shape judicial behavior to a 
degree that is inconsistent with the Court’s conception of judicial 
independence. All are plausibly deemed constitutional despite their deep 
 
 18 Vicki C. Jackson, Packages of Judicial Independence: The Selection and Tenure of Article III 
Judges, 95 GEO. L.J. 965, 971 (2007) (arguing that “[t]he selection mechanisms contemplated by the 
Constitution represent a distinctive set of choices,” and flagging alternatives both inside and beyond the 
American context). 
 19 See David Fontana & Aziz Z. Huq, Institutional Loyalties in Constitutional Law, 85 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 1, 3 (2018) (identifying institutional loyalty as one’s “tendency to identify with and to act in ways 
that promote their home institution”). 
 20 It is uncontroverted that the Philadelphia Convention looked to prior models of judiciaries in order 
to select between potential ways of organizing a court system, even if scholars disagree about which 
models commanded the most respect. See James E. Pfander & Daniel D. Birk, Article III and the Scottish 
Judiciary, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1613, 1620–21 (2011) (recounting scholarly debates over the structure of 
Article III courts); Daniel J. Meltzer, The History and Structure of Article III, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1569, 
1577–82 (1990) (discussing the drafting history of Article III). 
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tension with the Justices’ ideal of independence. Borrowing some terms from 
the scholarship on partisan gerrymandering, this Article labels these tactics 
cracking, packing, and stacking.21 Cracking entails the strategic dissection of 
jurisdiction to undermine judicial autonomy. Packing entails manipulation 
of the appointment process. And stacking entails recalibrations of 
substantive law to undermine judicial independence. Recent conflicts over 
judicial independence reveal the abiding force of all three methods, 
notwithstanding the Court’s effort to instantiate judicial independence in 
doctrinal form. 
The analysis offered here is intended to help clarify what we should or 
should not expect from federal courts’ judicial independence given the 
predictable institutional and partisan dynamics ushered into the world by the 
Constitution itself. Both judges and politicians invoke that term as if its 
defense could contribute to the rule of law, and the maintenance of a 
government constrained by the individual rights contained in the 
Constitution’s Bill of Rights. This Article’s analysis suggests that these 
hopes are overstated. When courts fail to vindicate the rule of law, the causes 
of their failure are deeply embedded in the Constitution. That failure follows 
from a fidelity to, not a heresy from, its original design. And a return to some 
“original” understanding will compound, not resolve, the difficulty. 
The Article’s approach is in one regard narrow and in another broad. 
On the one hand, it narrowly focuses exclusively and solely on federal courts. 
As the Court has recently noted, the organization of both state courts22 and 
federal agency adjudications23 raise separate independence- and integrity-
related concerns. The question of how to define and implement federal court 
independence, this Article will argue, proves nettlesome enough to deserve 
careful treatment in isolation. On the other hand, this Article also offers a 
broader contribution by underscoring a deep conflict in constitutional 
discourse between “aspirational” or “nonconcessive” theories on the one 
 
 21 I borrow these terms from the literature on partisan gerrymandering. See, e.g., Pamela S. Karlan, 
All over the Map: The Supreme Court’s Voting Rights Trilogy, 1993 SUP. CT. REV. 245, 249 (“There are 
basically three ways in which geographic aggregation rules might impair a voter’s ability to elect her 
preferred candidate—the euphonious trio of cracking, stacking, and packing.”); see also FRANK R. 
PARKER, BLACK VOTES COUNT: POLITICAL EMPOWERMENT IN MISSISSIPPI AFTER 1965, at 48–51 (1990) 
(developing these terms). 
 22 See, e.g., Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 575 U.S. 433, 457 (2015) (noting the different versions of 
independence instantiated in federal and elected state courts, but declining to adjudicate between them). 
 23 See, e.g., Ballard v. Comm’r, 544 U.S. 40, 59 (2005) (holding that the Article I Tax Court, “like 
all other decisionmaking tribunals, is obliged to follow its own Rules”). 
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hand, and “realist” or “concessive” accounts on the other.24 An aspirational 
approach “holds individuals and institutions to standards that it is within their 
ability to meet, but that there is good reason to believe they will never 
meet.”25 It does so as a way of clarifying moral obligations. The second, more 
realistic mode of analysis, in contrast, is a way of recognizing that “certain 
sound moral principles of politics are not likely to be met,” but we should 
still “go on to ask what should be done”—specifically in the light of those 
concessions.26 It “counsels society to behave differently, and in ways that it 
could.”27 The gap between judicial rhetoric and practice when it comes to 
judicial independence is an example of the failure to distinguish clearly 
between a nonconcessive and a realist approach. The Justices view and act 
upon judicial independence as if it were a matter of nonconcessive theory, 
i.e., an aspiration unalloyed by any adjustment for or concession to 
antecedent circumstances—whether institutional, political, or psychological.  
This Article builds on a number of other important contributions to 
constitutional theory in the legal and political science literature. First, the 
distinction between aspirational and concessive levels of analysis is similar 
to Professor Richard Pildes’s rich and illuminating juxtaposition between a 
“general, essentialized level” of analysis and a more grounded “account of 
how these institutions actually function in, and over, time.”28 Professor 
Pildes, though, is concerned with the way in which institutions are described 
within the doctrine, not with how the interplay between the real and ideal 
creates or constrains the possibility of realizing a constitutional ideal such as 
judicial independence.29  
 
 24 See DAVID ESTLUND, UTOPOPHOBIA: ON THE LIMITS (IF ANY) OF POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 6 
(2019); see also David Estlund, Utopophobia, 42 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 113, 115–16 (2014) [hereinafter 
Estlund, Utopophobia] (developing the same distinction in a terser form). This is also known as the 
contrast between “full-compliance theory” and “‘partial compliance’ theory,” respectively. Laura 
Valentini, Ideal vs. Non‐Ideal Theory: A Conceptual Map, 7 PHIL. COMPASS 654, 654 (2012). 
 25 Estlund, Utopophobia, supra note 24, at 117–18. 
 26 Id. at 124. 
 27 Id. at 121. This possibility is not uncontested. Charles Mills, for example, worries that this 
approach will be “deeply antithetical to the proper goal of theoretical ethics as an enterprise.” Charles W. 
Mills, “Ideal Theory” as Ideology, 20 HYPATIA 165, 170 (2005) (emphasis omitted). The proof, at least 
for legal analysis, is in the pudding: Is it possible to articulate a defensible normative agenda given the 
nonconcessive circumstances in which courts in fact operate? 
 28 Richard H. Pildes, Institutional Formalism and Realism in Constitutional and Public Law, 
2013 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 2. Professor Pildes recognizes that “the tension between institutionally formalist 
and realist approaches is pervasive, even if often obscured or latent” and often fuels “[d]ramatic conflicts 
within the Court, as well as public and academic debates.” Id. at 3–4. This Article’s approach harmonizes 
with these observations. 
 29 For similar reasons, the analytic framing here also resonates with recent legal academic work 
relying on the economist’s “theory of the second best,” which concerns how social welfare can be 
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Second, this Article is a contribution to a vast literature on one of “most 
basic intellectual divisions in twentieth-century American legal thought . . . 
the law[–]politics divide.”30 The law–politics divide aims to demarcate a 
domain of “principle and reason” free from the “deal-wielding and expedient 
compromises of politics.”31 Judicial independence both capitalizes on this 
ideal and complicates it. Judicial independence is, on the one hand, a 
regulative ideal that aspires to cleave apart the distinct realms of law and 
active politics.32 At the same time, judicial independence is itself constructed, 
as well as deconstructed, by strategic political action such as presidential 
invectives against the Court, bench-packing plans, and condemnations of 
specific judges. The conceptual and practical instability of judicial 
independence flows from this Janus-faced engagement with, and refusal of, 
the immersive field of politics. While the discourse of judicial independence 
draws on ideas of the law–politics divide, it should not be confused with the 
idea of a more general judicial capacity to drive social change. In large 
measure, the legal literature’s agenda in respect to the law–politics divide 
was established by the late Alexander Bickel’s worries about the so-called 
“counter-majoritarian difficulty.”33 Bickel directed attention to the operation 
of judicial review by the Supreme Court alone, in particular its capacity to 
advance the interests of marginalized and mistreated minorities, such as 
African Americans.34 Courts’ capacity for advancing social change, 
 
maximized under nonideal conditions. For a formal statement of the theory, see R.G. Lipsey & Kelvin 
Lancaster, The General Theory of Second Best, 24 REV. ECON. STUD. 11, 11 (1956). For applications of 
the theory to law as a counsel of indeterminacy, see Adrian Vermeule, System Effects and the 
Constitution, 123 HARV. L. REV. 4, 7, 17–23 (2009), and Adrian Vermeule, Hume’s Second-Best 
Constitutionalism, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 421, 422, 434 (2003). 
 30 Victoria Nourse & Gregory Shaffer, Varieties of New Legal Realism: Can a New World Order 
Prompt a New Legal Theory?, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 61, 121 (2009); see also B. Jessie Hill, Resistance to 
Constitutional Theory: The Supreme Court, Constitutional Change, and the ‘Pragmatic Moment,’ 
91 TEX. L. REV. 1815, 182023 (2013) (summarizing a range of descriptions and theorizations of the 
law–politics divide). 
 31 Nourse & Shaffer, supra note 30, at 121. 
 32 Cf. JUSTIN CROWE, BUILDING THE JUDICIARY: LAW, COURTS, AND THE POLITICS OF 
INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT 271 (2012) (noting the widely shared presumption that “judicial power is 
separate from and outside the realm of democratic politics,” and also doubting that presumption). 
 33 ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 16, 250 (1962) (expressing skepticism 
about judicial review of state laws on constitutional and normative grounds, including the idea that courts 
lack a mandate from a majority of the electorate for their actions). 
 34 Central to this debate has been a historiographical difference over the causal efficacy of the Court’s 
school-desegregation jurisprudence. Compare GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN 
COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? 3941 (2d ed. 2008) (casting doubt on the causal efficacy of 
Brown v. Board of Education), and Michael J. Klarman, How Brown Changed Race Relations: The 
Backlash Thesis, 81 J. AM. HIST. 81, 82 (1994) (focusing on the role of massive resistance in catalyzing 
changed opinions on Jim Crow), with David J. Garrow, Hopelessly Hollow History: Revisionist 
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however, is not identical to their independence: Independence can manifest 
as a willingness to propel social change or as a principled refusal to engage 
in that enterprise. And an important reason for the efficacy of judicial 
intervention in favor of minorities has been the support of other branches of 
government.35 To understand the judicial capacity for social change, 
therefore, is not the same as understanding the possible conditions of judicial 
independence. 
The analysis proceeds as follows. To motivate the analysis, Part I 
unpacks the Roberts Court’s ethical conception of judicial independence. 
Part II then explores the limits and internal contradictions of this 
jurisprudential vision. Switching to a more abstract level of analysis, Part III 
brings courts’ ethical conception into dialogue with the strategic realities of 
judicial independence. This Article focuses on the presuppositions infusing 
the Framers’ choice of one particular form of judicial independence from a 
larger design space of possibilities. This Article further explores the specific 
pathways created by the Constitution’s design for impingement on the 
judiciary’s autonomy as conceptualized by the Court. Part IV then offers a 
vision of what the ethical ambition of judicial independence can look like in 
praxis given these strategic constraints. 
I. JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AS ETHICAL ASPIRATION AND DOCTRINE 
The phrase “judicial independence” is not found in the text of the 
Constitution.36 Hence, its present jurisprudence cannot be a matter of textual 
exegesis alone. The doctrinal articulation of judicial independence instead 
starts from tradition and as an inference from the tripartite division between 
branches in the federal government. But tradition and structural inference 
alone cannot fully define the function and limits of the federal courts. 
Structural arguments and tradition, for instance, have failed to quell debate 
even on seemingly basic questions such as the scope of congressional 
authority over federal court jurisdiction.37 To fill the resulting gap, the 
 
Devaluing of Brown v. Board of Education, 80 VA. L. REV. 151, 152–53 (1994) (emphasizing Brown’s 
effect on the Montgomery Bus Boycott leaders).  
 35 See, e.g., J. Harvie Wilkinson, III, The Supreme Court and Southern School Desegregation, 1955–
1970: A History and Analysis, 64 VA. L. REV. 485, 53233 (1978) (discussing federal government 
involvement in desegregation). 
 36 Of course, it was known at the time of the Framing. Alexander Hamilton, most saliently, praises 
“[t]he complete independence of the courts of justice [as] peculiarly essential in a limited Constitution.” 
THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 466 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).  
 37 For recaps of this debate, see RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., JOHN F. MANNING, DANIEL J. MELTZER 
& DAVID L. SHAPIRO, HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 295–
97 (7th ed. 2015), and see also Henry P. Monaghan, Jurisdiction Stripping Circa 2020: What The 
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jurisprudence of judicial independence relies on a set of “[e]thical 
constitutional arguments . . . [concerning] the sort of people we are and the 
means we have chosen to solve political and customary constitutional 
problems.”38 Rather than a textual or historical imperative, it is an ethical 
ambition to create a distinction between law and politics that powerfully 
animates the Court’s jurisprudence of judicial independence. 
Yet at the same time, judicial independence is not a self-evident ethical 
concept. On its face, it bespeaks some sort of relational quality. But it does 
not by its terms specify against whom independence is defined: Is it the 
elected branches, the public, the parties at bar, or the judge’s own 
preferences? Even focusing on the elected branches as the objects of distrust 
(since they are the obvious objects of separation of powers analysis), there 
remain important questions of calibration: How much influence can 
Congress or the executive have before it becomes excessive? And through 
what means can influence be licitly exercised?39 Such questions are answered 
not in the abstract, but through a common law process of application and 
judgment. Rather than a Platonic ideal, therefore, judicial independence 
exists only in its particular, perhaps idiosyncratic, instantiations of a more 
general ethos. 
Working in this ethical register, the Roberts Court has been preoccupied 
with how to practically delineate judicial independence as operational fact. 
This Part offers a reading and an internal critique of three lines of cases in 
which the Roberts Court has defined judicial independence and deployed it 
to practical effects. This provides a “case study” for the ways in which that 
concept can be implemented.  
This Part proceeds first by identifying three distinct (and only loosely 
related) doctrinal strands that the Court has drawn from the abstract idea of 
judicial independence. These might be called independence in time, 
independence by the case, and independence in gross. The first, 
independence in time, concerns the timing of judicial intervention—as a 
response to private or state action and as the last word in respect to the 
legality of that event. The second, independence in gross, concerns the power 
to freely decide specific matters that are otherwise properly within the 
Court’s jurisdiction. As characterized by the Court, this is a matter of 
 
Dialogue (Still) Has to Teach Us, 69 DUKE L.J. 1, 70 (2019), which finds “lots of difficult problems still 
to wrestle with” in the field.   
 38 BOBBITT, supra note 15, at 94–95; see also Jamal Greene, Pathetic Argument in Constitutional 
Law, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1389, 1394 (2013) (describing ethical arguments as “a rhetorical mode 
grounded in the character of the speaker, here the character of the American people as embodied in their 
constitutional arrangements”). 
 39 Jackson, supra note 18, at 967 (noting questions of degree and mechanism in the definition of 
judicial independence).  
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exercising an independence of judgment. Finally, and notwithstanding the 
persisting uncertainty over the necessary scope of federal court jurisdiction, 
a third line of Supreme Court cases, concerning independence in gross, 
underscores the mandatory quality of such jurisdiction over whole classes of 
litigation. Despite sharing a conceptual and linguistic matrix, these three 
lines of cases are not in direct conversation with each other. Indeed, there is 
a dearth of academic analysis of their commonalities. 
A. Independence in Time 
A first element of the constitutional ethos around federal courts—
independence in time—predates the Roberts Court. It imagines federal courts 
as standing in a distinct temporal relationship to litigants generally, and more 
specifically to other branches of government.40 On one side, doctrines such 
as ripeness, standing, and the ban on advisory opinions are supposed to 
foreclose the possibility that courts would act as first movers, resolving 
“abstract” and “remote” questions of law.41 On the other side of the temporal 
spectrum, the Court has constitutionalized the finality of federal court 
judgments.42 The net effect of these doctrines is to preclude early intervention 
by the courts, while ensuring that when judicial intervention occurs, its effect 
is enduring. 
Hence, in Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, the Court established a categorical 
rule giving “the Federal Judiciary the power, not merely to rule on cases, but 
to decide them, subject to review only by superior courts in the Article III 
hierarchy.”43 Citing the colonial experience with legislative tribunals as sites 
of “vigorous, indeed often radical, populism,” the Plaut Court attributed to 
the Framers a “sense of a sharp necessity to separate the legislative from the 
judicial power.”44 
 
 40 Cf. Henry P. Monaghan, Constitutional Adjudication: The Who and When, 82 YALE L.J. 1363, 
1384 (1973) (discussing the “time frame” of federal court litigation). 
 41 See Kenneth Culp Davis, Ripeness of Government Action for Judicial Review, 68 HARV. L. REV. 
1122, 1122 (1955); see also Evan Tsen Lee, Deconstitutionalizing Justiciability: The Example of 
Mootness, 105 HARV. L. REV. 603, 606 (1992) (“[T]he law of ripeness ensures that the plaintiff has not 
asserted the claim too early, and the law of mootness seeks to prevent the plaintiff from asserting the 
claim too late.”).  
 42 Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 239 (1995) (asserting the “conclusiveness of judicial 
judgments”). Commentators underscore Plaut’s relationship to time. Frederic Bloom, The Law’s Clock, 
104 GEO. L.J. 1, 30 (2015) (“To define finality, Plaut says, is to set the law’s clock and to exercise judicial 
power. That is the courts’ role alone.”). 
 43 514 U.S. at 218–19.  
 44 Id. at 219, 221. The Plaut Court’s reliance on a gestalt understanding of the Framers’ general-
design ambitions ranks it as an instance of ethical argument. For a similar argument canvassing a wider 
array of sources, see William Baude, The Judgment Power, 96 GEO. L.J. 1807, 1816 (2008), explaining 
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The Plaut principle is repeatedly adduced in the lines of the 
jurisprudence described below.45 It is also invoked in unrelated cases in a 
way that suggests that the Roberts Court now treats it as settled law.46 Given 
the frequency with which it is cited, Plaut is plausibly viewed as a bedrock 
precedent in the Court’s development of a more general account of judicial 
independence. 
B. Independence by the Case: Two Variations 
The second element of judicial independence—independence by the 
case—interprets that concept in terms of a court’s unfettered authority to 
exercise its judgment in respect to the legal questions in a specific case 
otherwise properly presented to the relevant tribunal. On this account, the 
elected branches traduce judicial independence when they impermissibly 
interfere with the manner in which a specific case is decided. Much of the 
Roberts Court’s anxieties about the courts’ autonomy have been channeled 
into this conception. To date, such concerns have not yet translated into the 
kind of crisp doctrinal breakwater found in Plaut. More modestly, they have 
destabilized an important structural pillar of the regulatory state and renewed 
litigant attention to a venerable federal courts rule of uncertain scope and 
impact. In both lines of cases, the extant doctrine appears highly contingent 
and unsettled. Even in the medium term of the Roberts Court’s duration, it 
may well prove unstable. 
Independence by the case takes two doctrinal forms. The first is a worry 
about judicial deference to administrative agencies’ views on the law.47 
Federal administrative agencies commonly receive deference when they 
interpret either the federal statutes they are charged with enforcing48 or the 
regulations that they have previously promulgated.49 The first is called 
 
that “[n]umerous others’ described the independent power of the Judiciary to resolve particular disputes 
as a central element of the Philadelphia Constitution.” 
 45 See, e.g., Patchak v. Zinke, 138 S. Ct. 897, 905 (2018) (“The separation of powers, among other 
things, prevents Congress from exercising the judicial power.” (citing Plaut, 514 U.S. at 218)). 
 46 See, e.g., B&B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus., Inc., 575 U.S. 138, 150 (2015) (citing Plaut, 
514 U.S. at 231–32, for the finality principle); Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2142 & n.77 
(2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). 
 47 These lines of criticisms are part of a more general assault on the federal regulatory state that “[i]n 
the last few decades . . . [has] reached a high level of intensity, a kind of fever pitch.” Cass R. Sunstein 
& Adrian Vermeule, The Morality of Administrative Law, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1924, 1928 (2018) 
(situating attacks on deference in this context). With only a little loss of accuracy, we can generalize by 
saying these attacks emerge from the political right. 
 48 See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 842–45 (1984). 
 49 See Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997); Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 
410, 413–14 (1945). 
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Chevron deference and the second Auer deference. Both deference rules 
have been recently and vigorously impugned on the ground that such 
deference is inconsistent with a court’s obligation to reach and apply an 
independent judgment of the law. This argument, to date, is fully articulated 
only in the law reviews.50 Although Justices have started to criticize Chevron 
deference, they have not yet leveraged the concept of judicial independence 
against it.51 Whether this remains a tenable equilibrium remains somewhat 
doubtful: A full-blown assault on Chevron deference, which draws on 
arguments about judicial independence, seems likely to be mounted sooner 
or later. 
The challenge to Auer deference, in contrast, has been more fully aired 
in the courts, and underpinned there by a more robust assertion of judicial 
independence as a constitutional ethos. This challenge found a doctrinal form 
in Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Association, a 2015 case concerning a D.C. 
Circuit Court precedent that required agencies to employ notice-and-
comment procedures when they wished to issue a new interpretation of a 
regulation that deviated significantly from a previously adopted view of the 
law.52 In separate concurrences, Justices Samuel Alito, Antonin Scalia, and 
Clarence Thomas each seeded a constitutional argument against Auer 
deference.53 Justice Thomas’s version of the argument played upon the theme 
of judicial independence with greatest energy. The core of this argument was 
his assertion that deference “represents a transfer of judicial power to the 
Executive Branch.”54 The judicial power, on Justice Thomas’s account, 
“include[s] the power to resolve [legal] ambiguities over time” in an 
 
 50 See, e.g., Philip Hamburger, Chevron Bias, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1187, 1189 (2016) (arguing 
that Chevron is incompatible with judicial independence by requiring Article III courts to defer to the 
views of one of the parties to a dispute); Thomas W. Merrill, Fair and Impartial Adjudication, 26 GEO. 
MASON L. REV. 897, 907 (2019) (worrying that Chevron “puts agencies in the driver’s seat with respect 
to both questions of law and questions of fact, with Article III courts retreating to the function of 
monitoring agencies for extreme outcomes that can be characterized as unreasonable”). 
 51 In a single, somewhat throwaway sentence, Justice Kennedy suggested that “[t]he proper rules for 
interpreting statutes and determining agency jurisdiction and substantive agency powers should accord 
with constitutional separation-of-powers principles and the function and province of the Judiciary.” 
Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105, 2121 (2018) (Kennedy, J., concurring); see also SAS Inst., Inc. v. 
Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1358 (2018) (mentioning but declining to rule on the petitioner’s judicial-
independence-based attack on Chevron deference). These hints have yet to reach fruition. 
 52 Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1205–06 (2015). For an earlier intimation of the 
challenge, see Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 567 U.S. 142, 155–59 (2012). 
 53 See Perez, 135 S. Ct. at 1210 (Alito, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); id. at 
1213 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 1213–15 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 54 Id. at 1217 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment). 
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“authoritative” fashion.55 Supplementing this formalist account, Justice 
Thomas also offered a consequentialist argument about “the judicial ‘check’ 
on the political branches” accumulating too much power.56 This argument 
against tyranny of a sort complemented Justice Scalia’s concern about the 
risk of self-dealing that arises when an agency interpretation is given 
deference in cases where the agency itself is the defendant.57 
In Kisor v. Wilkie, the ensuing frontal challenge to Auer, Justice 
Gorsuch made a similar (but less extensive) argument about judicial 
independence, bemoaning “the dangers of executive and legislative intrusion 
on judicial decision-making.”58 He offered two further consequential 
arguments to illustrate the danger of deference. First, he contended that 
deference to an agency’s interpretation of their own regulations had an 
undesirable distributive effect because it would favor “the powerful, well-
heeled, popular, and connected [who] can wheedle favorable outcomes.”59 
Second, Justice Gorsuch appealed to a distinction between “[t]he rule of law” 
and “the rule of men.”60 On his theory, judicial independence by the case is 
a way of installing the law–politics distinction at the level of the discrete 
case. Its empirical premise is that judges and elected officials are driven by 
wholly different classes of motivation. Judges, in contrast to legislators or 
other holders of elected office, lack “their own [policy] interests, their own 
constituencies, and their own policy goals.”61  
 
 55 Id.; see also id. at 1218 (“Independent judgment required judges to decide cases in accordance 
with the law of the land, not in accordance with pressures placed upon them through either internal or 
external sources.”). 
 56 Id. at 1220; id. at 1221 (warning of “the accumulation of governmental powers” among 
administrative agencies); see also id. at 1212–13 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (striking a similar 
Madisonian note focused on the separation of powers).  
 57 See Talk Am., Inc. v. Mich. Bell Tel. Co., 564 U.S. 50, 68 (2011) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“It seems 
contrary to fundamental principles of separation of powers to permit the person who promulgates a law 
to interpret it as well.”). 
 58 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2437 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., concurring in the judgment). Of course, this was 
contested by Justice Kagan’s plurality opinion. Id. at 2421 (plurality opinion) (“Properly understood and 
applied, Auer does no such thing. In all the ways we have described, courts retain a firm grip on the 
interpretive function.”). 
 59 Id. at 2438 (Gorsuch, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 60 Id. 
 61 See id. at 2439 (“When we defer to an agency interpretation that differs from what we believe to 
be the best interpretation of the law, we compromise our judicial independence and deny the people who 
come before us the impartial judgment that the Constitution guarantees them. And we mislead those 
whom we serve by placing a judicial imprimatur on what is, in fact, no more than an exercise of raw 
political executive power.”). Notice that Justice Gorsuch’s argument is not formalist. It is rather an 
assertion about actual, observable regularities in the different behavior of administrators and judges. It 
may be a species of “categorical realism,” which seems to describe agencies and “courts as a general or 
categorical matter.” See Pildes, supra note 28, at 8. But it is not a purely formalist claim. 
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The second form of independence by the case has emerged in an unclear 
and erratic line of cases starting with an obscure 1871 precedent concerning 
presidential pardons for former Confederate sympathizers, in which the 
Court has suggested that a legislative action should be invalidated because it 
denigrated judicial independence by interfering with the finality of a judicial 
judgment.62 Like the assault on Auer deference, this second doctrinal form of 
independence by the case has yet to ripen into a binding holding backed by 
a Supreme Court majority. Indeed, after a long string of cases in which the 
Court distinguished the 1871 case, this form of independence experienced a 
palpable setback during the Roberts Court.  
This line of cases rests on the contested and “deeply puzzling”63 legacy 
of an 1871 precedent called United States v. Klein.64 Klein seemed to 
announce a prohibition on legislative “rules of decisions” in pending cases, 
i.e., laws whereby “the court is forbidden to give the effect to evidence 
which, in its own judgment, such evidence should have, and is directed to 
give it an effect precisely contrary.”65 Periodically after the 1870s, the Court 
has tangled with this cryptic yet seemingly vital presupposition about judicial 
power.66 These encounters, however, have yielded little clarity. 
The Roberts Court has twice glossed the Klein rule in only a handful of 
recent years. Over some sharply worded dissents, a plurality has winnowed 
it to a vestigial nub in two important cases. In Bank Markazi v. Petersen, the 
Court upheld provisions of the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human 
Rights Act of 2012, stating that the “financial assets that are identified in . . . 
Peterson et al. v. Islamic Republic of Iran et al.” would be available “to 
satisfy any judgment . . . awarded against Iran for damages for personal 
injury or death caused by” acts of terrorism.67 Despite the fact that this 
language explicitly singled out a specific, then-ongoing litigation, and even 
nudged (or perhaps more accurately, violently shouldered) the federal courts 
toward a particular resolution of that matter, a majority of the Court validated 
it as consistent with the ideal of an “independent Judiciary” established by 
 
 62 United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 146–47 (1871). 
 63 Lawrence G. Sager, Klein’s First Principle: A Proposed Solution, 86 GEO. L.J. 2525, 2525 (1998).  
 64 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128.  
 65 Id. at 146–47. 
 66 See, e.g., Martinez v. Lamagno, 515 U.S. 417 (1995) (holding reviewable judicial review of 
executive action when there is no persuasive reason that Congress intended the action to be 
unreviewable); Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Soc’y, 503 U.S. 429 (1992) (refusing to address whether 
the Court of Appeals’ reading of Klein was correct because Congress amended the underlying law rather 
than directing a particular result under old law).  
 67 136 S. Ct. 1310, 1318–19 (2016) (quoting 22 U.S.C. § 8772(a)(1)(C), (b)).  
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Article III.68 Underscoring the foreign affairs tincture of the case, the 
majority rejected the argument that when a statute “directs courts to apply a 
new legal standard to undisputed facts,” it is invalid, especially when there 
was no “foregone conclusion[]” about the result.69 Chief Justice Roberts, as 
intimated in the Introduction, demurred, insisting that the provision at issue 
did mandate a particular result, and that this “invad[ed] the judicial power.”70 
The second decision glossing Klein, Patchak v. Zinke, concerned a 
Department of the Interior decision to take certain land into trust on behalf 
of an Indian tribe.71 In relation to the statute at issue, Congress declared the 
Department’s decision lawful and directed the federal courts to dismiss all 
suits related to the land in question.72 Again, the Court upheld a statutory 
impingement on a pending case from a Klein attack.73 The Patchak plurality 
recognized the provision as precisely the kind of interest-group capture that 
Justices Gorsuch and Thomas had condemned in their sallies against Auer 
deference.74 Yet, the plurality opinion by Justice Thomas nevertheless upheld 
the measure. It drew a clear, formalistic separation between the permissible 
enactment of “new laws that apply to pending civil cases” and legislative 
efforts to alter the outcome of a litigation without the creation of “new law.”75 
Three Justices concurred on the narrower grounds that Congress had 
authority to alter the underlying trust disposition or withdraw its waiver of 
sovereign immunity without creating a Klein problem.76 Again, Chief Justice 
Roberts offered a sharply worded defense of “an independent judiciary” as 
“necessary to secure individual freedom” and imperiled when Congress 
“target[s] a single party for adverse treatment.”77 This dissent is by no means 
 
 68 Id. at 1322. 
 69 Id. at 1325. 
 70 Id. at 1329–30 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); id. at 1332 (characterizing the case as one in which 
“Congress assumes the role of judge and decides a particular pending case”). 
 71 138 S. Ct. 897, 902–03 (2018) (plurality opinion). 
 72 Id.  
 73 See id. at 910. 
 74 See id. (recognizing that “the Band exercised its political influence to persuade Congress to enact 
a narrow jurisdiction-stripping provision that effectively ends all lawsuits threatening its casino”). 
 75 Id. at 909. 
 76 See id. at 911 (Breyer, J., concurring) (“The petitioner does not argue that Congress acted 
unconstitutionally by ratifying the Secretary’s actions and the land’s trust status, and I am aware of no 
substantial argument to that effect.”); id. at 913 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in the judgment) (arguing that 
the relevant statutory provision “should not be read to strip the federal courts of jurisdiction but rather to 
restore the Federal Government’s sovereign immunity”); id. at 912–13 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in the 
judgment) (making the same sovereign-immunity-restoration argument as Justice Sotomayor). 
 77 Id. at 915, 917 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). Central to Chief Justice Roberts’s argument was the 
sense that the law in question singled out “a class of one,” and rejected the idea that Congress’s 
jurisdictional authority licensed it to resolve specific, individual cases. Id. at 918–20. Arbitrary treatment 
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doomed, moreover, to practical irrelevance. It might in the future peel away 
one of the concurring Justices who avoided the Klein question. It hence 
might be the foundation for a new majority at odds with the Patchak plurality 
view. 
The immediate effect of Bank Markazi and Patchak is to license 
targeted legislation aimed at the goal of settling specific suits.78 In the long 
term, the effect of these opinions will depend not just on the Court’s 
coalitional politics, but also on how their licensing of congressional 
influence upon the judiciary’s policy effects changes the balance of 
institutional power at the margin. As Part II elaborates, the magnitude of this 
marginal effect will depend on the nature of conflicts between the judiciary 
and elected branches in the future. 
C. Independence in Gross: The Private–Public Rights Distinction 
The third jurisprudential strand of judicial independence is called 
independence in gross. It concerns the exercise of legislative power in 
respect not to individual cases, but rather to whole classes of litigation. Once 
again, these cases arise in the context of a broader assault on longstanding 
administrative law principles. Here, the Court has limited the types of cases 
non-Article III courts can hear by building on a distinction between public 
and private rights. A weaker manifestation of the same idea can be discerned 
when the Court construes statutes to avoid curtailment of the judicial power 
to settle legal questions.79 This Article will focus here on the strand that has 
most preoccupied the Roberts Court, a strand that involves a policing of the 
private rights–public rights boundary, or the public rights doctrine. 
The Roberts Court has drawn upon an early nineteenth-century 
distinction between “public rights” and “private rights” matters to identify a 
class of litigation that cannot be alienated to a non-Article III federal court.80 
Although the Court’s distinction is not entirely pellucid—which this Article 
discusses more below—the Court seems to sort private rights of tort and 
contract on the one hand from statutory interests on the other. The former 
 
of a “class of one” can also violate the Equal Protection Clause. See Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 
528 U.S. 562, 564–65 (2000) (per curiam).  
 78 See, e.g., Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act, Pub. L. No. 109-92, 119 Stat. 2095, 2095–
97 (2005) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 7902(b)) (requiring immediate dismissal of pending 
lawsuits against manufacturers or sellers of firearms). 
 79 See, e.g., Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2141–42 (2016); Abbott v. Perez, 
138 S. Ct. 2305, 2321 (2018). 
 80 The distinction’s jurisprudence is conventionally traced to Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & 
Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272, 284–85 (1856), distinguishing cases of public rights from cases 
of common law, equity, or admiralty, the latter three being cases of private right.  
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must be resolved in Article III forums, while the latter can be removed from 
the Article III context.81 The ensuing jurisprudence previously had an 
unstable quality, with the Court historically pinballing from a restrictive, 
formalist approach to a more latitudinarian, functionalist one.82 In contrast, 
the Roberts Court’s approach to date appears to be relatively stable and 
hospitable to concerns about judicial independence.83 
Rather than occurring at the retail level of the specific case, the problem 
here arises wholesale: a genre of litigation that belongs in the federal courts 
because it involves a private right has been moved into another federal 
forum, either a non-Article III bankruptcy court or an administrative agency 
adjudication. In the bankruptcy context, the leading case is Stern v. Marshall, 
which held that the statutory category of “counterclaims by [the] estate 
against persons filing claims against the estate” assigned to non-Article III 
bankruptcy judges violated Article III.84 Key to Stern’s conclusion was a 
background understanding of Article III as “‘an inseparable element of the 
constitutional system of checks and balances’ that ‘both defines the power 
and protects the independence of the Judicial Branch’”85 for the sake of 
“liberty.”86 
Using a similar framework, in Oil States Energy Services v. Greene’s 
Energy Group, the Court evaluated the constitutionality of Congress’s 
assignment to the United States Patent and Trademark Office of the “[i]nter 
partes review” process—the rereview and potential cancelation of previously 
 
 81 Note that the distinction in the main text misleads insofar as it omits the possibility of delegation 
to state courts, which appears uncontroversial. Professor Caleb Nelson has written an influential historical 
treatment of the distinction. Caleb Nelson, Adjudication in the Political Branches, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 
559, 561–62 (2007) (“Americans . . . concluded that the protection of individual rights to person and 
propertycore ‘private rights’ of the sort that (on John Locke’s influential account) government was 
instituted to safeguardtriggers different political calculations, and therefore requires different 
institutional arrangements, than the protection of ‘public rights’ belonging to the body politic.”); see also 
Gordon G. Young, Public Rights and the Federal Judicial Power: From Murray’s Lessee Through 
Crowell to Schor, 35 BUFF. L. REV. 765, 770–71 (1986) (offering a similar account). 
 82 Aziz Z. Huq & Jon D. Michaels, The Cycles of Separation-of-Powers Jurisprudence, 126 YALE 
L.J. 346, 368–72 (2016) (documenting cycling in this line of cases). 
 83 There are, for example, some Justices who would do away wholesale with agency adjudication. 
See, e.g., B & B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1293, 1316 (2015) (Thomas, J., 
dissenting) (“Because federal administrative agencies are part of the Executive Branch, it is not clear that 
they have power to adjudicate claims involving core private rights.”). At least so far, that does not appear 
to be a solution that is in the cards. 
 84 564 U.S. 462, 474, 503 (2011) (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(C)). For a history and description 
of the bankruptcy bench, see Anthony J. Casey & Aziz Z. Huq, The Article III Problem in Bankruptcy, 
82 U. CHI. L. REV. 1155, 1167–73 (2015). 
 85 564 U.S. at 482–83 (quoting N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 58 
(1982) (plurality opinion)). 
 86 Id. at 483. 
115:1055 (2021) Why Judicial Independence Fails 
1075  
issued patents.87 Unlike the state law claim at issue in Stern, however, the 
patent at issue here was characterized as a public right on the ground that it 
“ar[o]se between the Government and persons subject to its authority in 
connection with the performance of the constitutional functions of the 
executive or legislative departments.”88 
These cases share not just a common analytic framework—the 
distinction between public and private rights—but also a unified normative 
orientation. The challenges to judicial independence from bankruptcy judges 
and agency adjudication arise because of the way in which both arrogate a 
slice of the federal bench’s authority. But unlike the argument against Auer 
deference, which focuses on intralitigation distortions, the concern with non-
Article III forums is described in terms of lost jurisdiction rather than 
compromised decisional autonomy. At least at first blush, though, there is a 
common intuition at work here and in the independence-by-the-case 
jurisprudence: the notion that judicial independence is closely associated 
with the sheer magnitude of judicial power to decide questions of law. 
D. The Roberts Court’s Uncertain Approach to Judicial Independence 
Judicial independence is a signature concern for the Roberts Court. This 
concern can be seen not only for the Chief Justice’s pronouncements in the 
judiciary’s annual report and in his rare public communications, but also in 
the case reporters. The modern Supreme Court has developed three doctrinal 
varietals of judicial independence. Not all are consistently honored. But 
each—at some level of generality, and with the right facts—commands 
majority support among the Justices. In net, the three lines of cases capture 
a comprehensive judicial specification of the more general and abstract ethic 
of judicial independence that is lurking in the background of the case law. 
Moreover, judicial independence, when pitched at a high enough level 
of generality, seems not to be a matter of partisan ideological contention. 
Rather, a distinctive feature of judicial independence in the Roberts Court is 
its lack of a simple ideological correlate. Instead of having a consistent 
political valence, judicial independence has attracted a motley array of 
advocates. All Justices endorse the Plaut rule. In contrast, only the more 
conservative Justices fervently assert the distinctiveness of public rights, 
although others also toe that line. And Chief Justice Roberts, with unlikely 
bedfellows Justices Sonia Sotomayor and Gorsuch, has revived (or perhaps 
 
 87 138 S. Ct. 1365, 1372–73 (2018). 
 88 Id. at 1373 (quoting Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 50 (1932)). 
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transmuted) the Klein doctrine.89 From these lineups, therefore, it would 
seem that the ethical aspiration of judicial independence holds some allure 
for all of the Justices—but not all of the time or necessarily in the same way.  
The concept of judicial independence is, in sum, in its general form a 
nexus of ideological convergence and, in its specifics, an anvil for 
ideologically unexpected divisions. 
II. THE JUDICIAL RECESSION FROM JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE  
Judicial independence may be on everyone’s lips, but that does not 
mean that all are singing from the same hymnal. The fragile persistence of 
Auer and the uncertain retirement of the Klein “rule of decision” prohibition 
suggest that the doctrine’s stability should not be taken for granted. Yet, 
these tensions do not exhaust the Roberts Court’s difficulties in instantiating 
judicial independence. Dig deeper into the doctrine and one quickly detects 
other cracks in the edifice. In some places, the Court’s conceptualizations of 
judicial independence are hedged with provisos that rob them of much of 
their effectual force. Or else the Court conspicuously and inexplicably fails 
to extend its ethical understanding of judicial independence to a domain or 
legal question where, by its terms, it should logically extend. 
These fissures are evidence of something more than the usual 
compromises and negotiations that attend doctrinal design. Instead, they 
suggest a more profound, structural conflict between the ethical aspiration 
and strategic institutional reality of judicial independence.  
To establish the threshold premise that there are contradictions and 
tensions in the project of articulating judicial independence, this Part 
develops two lines of critique internal to the doctrine. In tandem, they supply 
a motivation for a more extensive diagnosis of that internal tension in Part 
III. The first critique develops a worry about how the Court chooses which 
forms of judicial independence to defend. The Justices consistently lack any 
explanation of why these three aspects of independence should be protected 
and not others. While other manifestations of institutional autonomy have 
been previously flagged by members of the Court, these alternatives have 
either been ignored or forgotten. The result is case law of judicial 
independence that lacks a single coherent and unified internal logic. 
Second, this Article develops a concern about how the Court has chosen 
to extend or delimit its ethical aspiration through doctrine. In particular, this 
Article attends to what the Court pointedly fails to do once it has recognized 
 
 89 See Bank Markazi v. Peterson, 136 S. Ct. 1310, 1329 (2016) (Roberts, C.J., joined by Sotomayor, 
J., dissenting); Patchak v. Zinke, 138 S. Ct. 897, 914 (2018) (Roberts, C.J., joined by Kennedy & Gorsuch, 
JJ., dissenting). 
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a specific form of independence as meriting doctrinal protection. Even 
within the carefully cultivated and securely immured garden of the Supreme 
Court’s jurisprudence, Justices recoil from the full implementation of the 
grand ideals that they have otherwise articulated. In respect to each of the 
three doctrinal formulations of judicial independence, this Article shows that 
the Court has either (1) self-consciously formulated a rule of law that plainly 
leaves open the possibility of circumvention, in effect taking with one hand 
what it gives with the other, or (2) conspicuously failed to apply the doctrine 
of judicial independence to a domain to which it would obviously reach. 
What ensues is distinct from the well-recognized phenomenon of 
“underenforced” constitutional norms,90 with derogation from the 
constitutional ideal far more substantial—even complete—than in the 
ordinary case.91 
A. Why These Aspects of Judicial Independence? 
A first concern about the Roberts Court’s project of rejuvenating 
judicial independence goes to its internal coherence. The Court has offered 
no account of why it enforces these three instantiations of judicial 
independence and not others.92 In the absence of a guiding theory, a mystery 
abides: There are a number of quite different ways of understanding and 
implementing judicial independence, as the Justices themselves have 
fleetingly recognized. Without a theory to serve as guiding compass, 
however, it is hard to know why these three particular instantiations should 
be made to bear all of the normative weight of the ethical aspiration toward 
judicial autonomy, and why other manifestations should be sidelined. 
The Constitution’s text does not pick out any one of the three forms of 
judicial independence mentioned above. Indeed, textual exegesis does not 
provide a solid berth for the finality rule, the public rights doctrine, the Klein 
rule, or the worry about Auer deference. Moreover, once one moves outside 
the text, a surfeit of different ways of understanding judicial independence 
appears. 
 
 90 Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 
91 HARV. L. REV. 1212, 1213 (1978) (describing “an important distinction between a statement which 
describes an ideal which is embodied in the Constitution and a statement which attempts to translate such 
an ideal into a workable standard for the decision of concrete issues”). 
 91 Normally, the Court “adopts a decision rule to implement the operative proposition.” Kermit 
Roosevelt III, Constitutional Calcification: How the Law Becomes What the Court Does, 91 VA. L. REV. 
1649, 1657 (2005). But here, the decision rule and the operative proposition are in conflict. 
 92 See supra Sections I.A–C. 
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In the American constitutional tradition, it is possible to pick out several 
ways in which judicial independence could be conceptualized and protected. 
In a recent historical survey of debates about judicial independence, for 
example, Professor Tara Leigh Grove has argued that “much of the judicial 
independence that we take for granted today depends on convention”93 rather 
than explicit constitutional norms or judicial precedent. To substantiate this 
argument, she has distinguished “court-curbing,” a tactic prohibited by “a 
political norm,” from “jurisdiction-stripping,” to which “no broad bipartisan 
norm” has emerged.94 Her ensuing extensive taxonomy of the various forms 
of legislative action that fit into one of these two categories demonstrates 
that there are many ways in which one can imagine judicial independence 
being derogated. Yet, not only do political norms fail to cover all of this 
waterfront, but the Court has also conspicuously selected only three varieties 
of legislative action that can impinge on its autonomy. 
This failure cannot be explained by a lack of opportunities to develop a 
more general theory of judicial independence. Within the federal system, 
Professor Vicki Jackson has observed, there are a number of different 
“packages” of institutional choices with respect to the independence “of 
Article III judges, of other judicial officers appointed by Article III judges, 
of Article I or ‘legislative’ tribunals in the territories and for specific subject 
matters.”95 Allocating jurisdictional responsibilities between these forums 
might be thought to require a theory of why an Article III tribunal is 
distinct—a constitutional theory, that is, of institutional independence that 
allows the Court to sort between tribunals with different characteristics. Alas, 
the doctrine has not yielded a litmus test for this purpose.  
In the public rights line of cases that includes Stern and Oil States, the 
Court instead appears to assume that the mere absence of an Article III label 
is itself a reliable indicator of an absence of independence. It is hardly clear 
why this would be the case. To the contrary, Professor Troy McKenzie has 
argued that “bankruptcy judges are . . . more insulated from the legislative 
and executive branches than most federal district judges” because they are 
“selected from the bankruptcy bar on their professional merits, not their 
political leanings,” and because they “do not generally seek elevation to 
 
 93 Tara Leigh Grove, The Origins (and Fragility) of Judicial Independence, 71 VAND. L. REV. 465, 
517 (2018) [hereinafter Grove, Origins]. 
 94 Id. at 517–18.  
 95 See Jackson, supra note 18, at 972; see also Judith Resnik, The Mythic Meaning of Article III 
Courts, 56 U. COLO. L. REV. 581, 582 (1985) [hereinafter Resnik, Mythic Meaning] (framing a similar 
question).  
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‘higher’ judicial office.”96 It is not clear, that is, why Congress cannot fashion 
institutional characteristics that are at least as protective as Article III’s 
accoutrements.97 The Court’s categorical refusal to entertain that possibility, 
however, means that it has not had to offer an account of what institutional 
characteristics do conduce to judicial independence and which are 
superfluous. 
A similar theoretical lacuna arises in the federalism domain. Across the 
state and federal judiciaries, independence is operationalized in different 
ways. Despite occasional gestures of concern,98 the Court has steered clear 
of offering an account of judicial independence that would cover both sets 
of institutions.99  
Two efforts to theorize judicial independence are worth noting. The first 
fails to persuade, and the second has lacked any staying power. To begin 
with, Justice Thomas’s concurring opinion in Perez, an early and influential 
contribution to the independence-by-the-case formulation, invokes “John 
Locke and Baron de Montesquieu” to support the separateness of judicial 
power.100 But this conjuration of eighteenth-century intellectual history is 
singularly unhelpful in thinking about which aspects of judicial 
independence are critical in practice. Locke’s analysis of the separation of 
powers, for example, does not support a focus on an independent judiciary 
for the rather simple reason that he had no conception of autonomous 
courts.101 It would thus be quite implausible to take him, as Justice Thomas 
does, as providing an intellectual template for how judges could serve as 
safeguards of the rule of law against legislative or executive depredations. 
Montesquieu, it turns out, is not much more helpful. His work has been fairly 
described as “too complex and open to varying interpretations to produce a 
 
 96 Troy A. McKenzie, Judicial Independence, Autonomy, and the Bankruptcy Courts, 62 STAN. L. 
REV. 747, 793 (2010). 
 97 See infra Part III for a consideration of how well institutional safeguards in fact work. 
 98 See, e.g., Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 788–89 (2002) (O’Connor, J., 
concurring) (expressing concern that “if judges are subject to regular elections[,] they are likely to feel 
that they have at least some personal stake in the outcome of every publicized case”). 
 99 See, e.g., Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 575 U.S. 433, 457 (2015) (“It is not our place to resolve this 
enduring debate.”). 
 100 Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 575 U.S. 92, 116–17 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring in the 
judgment).  
 101 See JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 83–84 (C.B. Macpherson ed., Hackett 
Publ’g Co. 1980) (1690). Famously, Locke “treated judicial power as part of the executive power.” Suri 
Ratnapala, John Locke’s Doctrine of the Separation of Powers: A Re-Evaluation, 38 AM. J. JURIS. 189, 
189 (1993). 
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meaningfully determinate blueprint for government at the level of detailed 
implementation.”102 
A second pathway for the definition of judicial independence is Justice 
Lewis Powell’s account of “the judicial power” as being closely entangled 
with the judicial practice of stare decisis, i.e., “the respect [courts show] for 
[their] own previous opinions.”103 Justice Powell’s intuition seemed to be that 
the manner in which courts and legislatures reason is fundamentally 
different. Judges must respond to historically situated grounds, such as 
statutory and constitutional text or precedent. Legislators, and, to a lesser 
extent, agency officials, are bound by no such reasoned decision-making 
obligation in relation to historical material. On this view, a court’s past 
decisions should motivate its future decisions, whereas a legislature’s past 
decisions are irrelevant to its future decisions. This idea of motivational 
differentiation across the branches is consonant with Justice Gorsuch’s 
account of motivational variation between regulators and judges.104 Yet, 
despite sharp debates within the Roberts Court on the nature and force of 
stare decisis, the Powell conception of judicial independence fails to find an 
analytic purchase in the present debates over precedent.105 However, there is 
no account in the Court’s own work of the reasons for instantiating judicial 
independence using these means and not others. 
This Article defers to Part III for a more detailed exploration of the ways 
in which federal courts remain vulnerable to ends-oriented manipulation by 
 
 102 John F. Manning, Separation of Powers as Ordinary Interpretation, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1939, 
1996 (2011). While Montesquieu did at least conceptualize the judiciary as a distinct entity, he focused 
on juries (“the judges of the nation”) and not judges as the site of effectual independence. Jack N. Rakove, 
The Original Justifications for Judicial Independence, 95 GEO. L.J. 1061, 1064 (2007) (quoting 
CHARLES-LOUIS DE SECONDAT, BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS 163 (Anne M. 
Cohler, Basia Carolyn Miller & Harold Smauel Stone trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1989) (1748)). The 
casual, opportunistic, and misleading invocation of intellectual history to offer supposedly originalist 
justifications for attacks on the administrative state is not central to the analysis here. But it does mean 
there is no template in intellectual history for the congeries of forms associated with judicial independence 
presently.  
 103 Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Stare Decisis and Judicial Restraint, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 281, 287 
(1990). 
 104 See Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2437 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 105 Recent cases feature sharp debate about the nature of stare decisis. See, e.g., Janus v. Am. Fed’n 
of State, Cnty., & Mun. Emps., Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2460 (2018) (declining to follow precedent 
when “[f]undamental free speech rights” were at stake); South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080, 
2096 (2018) (stating that stare decisis is not an “inexorable command” (quoting Pearson v. Callahan, 
555 U.S. 223, 233 (2009))). The most sophisticated recent academic account of precedent, however, 
focuses on nonmerits considerations that “are susceptible to principled application by justices across the 
philosophical spectrum.” RANDY J. KOZEL, SETTLED VERSUS RIGHT: A THEORY OF PRECEDENT 13 
(2017). In attempting to use stare decisis to quell intracourt partisan divisions, Professor Randy Kozel 
usefully gestures toward the possibility of thinking about precedent in terms of judicial independence. 
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the political branches. But it is instructive to observe here that the Justices 
themselves (and not just Justice Powell) were once attentive to a wider 
palette of threats to judicial independence. Professors Thomas Merrill and 
Jerry Mashaw have separately pointed out that at the beginning of the 
twentieth century, the judiciary perceived its independence to be threatened 
not by excisions of jurisdiction, but by the opposite problem of jurisdictional 
overload as a consequence of the growing size of the federal regulatory 
state.106 This suggests that additions of jurisdiction can compromise the 
judicial power, as much as subtractions. Yet, this concern seems now 
forgotten even though it dominated during the late nineteenth century. It 
plays no overt part in contemporary discussions of the separation of powers, 
even if it is at work in the background of certain doctrinal choices.107 
Writing some thirty-five years ago about the bounds of Article III, 
Professor Judith Resnik noted a worrisome absence of theoretical coherence 
in the relevant case law of the day. She suggested that the doctrine was better 
understood as animated by a “myth” in which Article III judges “stand ready, 
as ‘gladiators’ of sorts, should the need arise” to “do battle with the executive 
(and in this country, with the legislature).”108 She suggested an explanation 
sounding in ethical aspiration rather than text, precedent, or historical 
experience with threats to the judiciary.109 In the intervening years, the 
theoretical aporia that Professor Resnik perspicuously isolated has not been 
ameliorated. This is so even as the Roberts Court has widened and deepened 
the doctrinal picture of judicial independence. 
B. Internal Limits to Judicial Independence 
So much for theoretical coherence. Even if one lacks a global account 
of independence in the abstract, it still ought to be possible to defend specific 
redoubts of institutional autonomy. Yet, even in this more specific task, the 
Roberts Court’s doctrinal enterprise falls curiously short. By examining 
 
 106 Thomas W. Merrill, Article III, Agency Adjudication, and the Origins of the Appellate Review 
Model of Administrative Law, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 939, 944, 980, 990 (2011) (“During the earlier era, 
the primary concern was that Article III courts would be drawn into matters of ‘administration’ that were 
not properly judicial. In other words, the concern was not dilution of the judicial power but contamination 
of that power.”); JERRY L. MASHAW, CREATING THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONSTITUTION: THE LOST ONE 
HUNDRED YEARS OF AMERICAN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 24–25 (2012) (offering a similar reading of the 
historical record). 
 107 See Aziz Z. Huq, Judicial Independence and the Rationing of Constitutional Remedies, 65 DUKE 
L.J. 1, 53 (2015) [hereinafter Huq, Rationing] (identifying “caseload management as a core institutional 
interest of the federal judiciary,” and identifying specific doctrinal lines in which it alters the law).  
 108 Resnik, Mythic Meaning, supra note 95, at 612. 
 109 See id. at 612–13. 
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closely each of the three formulations of judicial independence, this Section 
illustrates how each is ignored, circumvented, or otherwise rendered a 
vacuity by the Court. The result is less a “right–remedy gap,”110 and at times 
perhaps even a wholesale derogation from enforcement. 
1. When Finality Doesn’t Stick 
It is useful to begin with the bedrock Plaut rule of judgment finality.111 
This rule is commonly characterized as admitting of no exceptions.112 But 
this is not entirely true. Finality is not a self-defining term. Rather, as 
Professor Resnik has acutely observed, it is “a normative conclusion,” not 
an “objective reality.”113 Congress, as Professor Resnik noted, has some 
power to determine what counts as a judgment amenable to finality.114 The 
Court also has power to define what material elements of a judgment will be 
accorded finality.115 It could have exercised this definitional power to 
insulate judgments from any and all kinds of post hoc interference. But it has 
chosen not to do so—despite the fact that the norm of official compliance 
with federal court orders is of relatively recent vintage.116 
Indeed, only a scant few years after Plaut, the Court upheld in Miller v. 
French federal legislation changing the prospective effect of a prison-reform 
injunction, notwithstanding Congress’s lack of lawful power to unpick the 
underlying judgment. Nothing in Plaut, the Miller Court explained, called 
into doubt “Congress’ authority to alter the prospective effect of previously 
entered injunctions.”117 The practical effects of the Miller exception in cases 
where a Court has issued an injunction are large. Provided that legislation 
 
 110 See John C. Jeffries, Jr., The Right-Remedy Gap in Constitutional Law, 109 YALE L.J. 87, 98–
100 (1999). 
 111 See supra text accompanying notes 43–46 (citing Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 
218–19 (1995)).  
 112 See Adrian Vermeule, The Judicial Power in the State (and Federal) Courts, 2000 SUP. CT. REV. 
357, 367 (describing Plaut as a “broad” and “prophylactic” rule). Professor William Baude argues that 
the federal courts’ “judgment supremacy has jurisdictional limits.” Baude, supra note 44, at 1812. 
Professor Baude, though, recognizes that his argument is not purely descriptive of existing law, and would 
engender what he (mildly) characterizes as “[m]essy complications.” Id. at 1852. 
 113 Judith Resnik, Precluding Appeals, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 603, 615 (1985). 
 114 See id. at 614; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (setting forth provisions for appellate review of collateral 
orders).  
 115 See 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
 116 Grove, Origins, supra note 93, at 488 (finding that “throughout much of our history, prominent 
federal and state officials presumed that they could obstruct federal court orders with which they firmly 
disagreed,” and “the current convention requiring compliance did not clearly emerge until after the civil 
rights movement of the 1950s and 1960s”). 
 117 Miller v. French, 530 U.S. 327, 344 (2000) (citing Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 
232 (1995)). 
115:1055 (2021) Why Judicial Independence Fails 
1083  
does not independently violate the Constitution, a prior injunction based on 
a valid judgment does not stop elected branches from engaging in ends-
oriented manipulation of that injunction’s practical force. Indeed, this is not 
the only way in which the elected branches can change the effective force of 
an injunction from a federal court. In practice, Professor Nicholas Parrillo 
has demonstrated, federal court orders against administrative agencies often 
generate extended “compliance negotiations” between the government and 
the court over the terms of future conduct.118 Both Congress and the 
Executive Branch, therefore, exercise in practice a large measure of 
discretion despite the putatively binding effect of a federal court injunction. 
What of money judgments? The Court has never addressed the question 
of whether Congress may alter monetary entitlements through its taxing or 
regulatory authority in ways that de facto negate the effects of a federal court 
judgment. To be sure, the United States may certainly waive the benefit of a 
prior judgment in its favor, in effect reassigning a right after a court has 
acted.119 Perhaps closer to the mark, there is a well-known historical tradition 
of legislative indemnification of federal-officer defendants in the wake of 
adverse torts judgments.120 Indemnification in constitutional tort cases, which 
remains common today,121 alters the redistributive entitlements created by a 
money judgment. In the limited class of cases where government assumes a 
liability of a federal-officer defendant and then asserts a species of sovereign 
immunity to preclude relief, it can amount to an effectual negation of the 
judgment.122 Hence, the doctrinal formulation of judicial finality creates no 
 
 118 Nicholas R. Parrillo, Negotiating the Federal Government’s Compliance with Court Orders: An 
Initial Exploration, 97 N.C. L. REV. 899, 901 (2019). 
 119 United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. 371, 397 (1980).  
 120 See James E. Pfander & Jonathan L. Hunt, Public Wrongs and Private Bills: Indemnification and 
Government Accountability in the Early Republic, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1862, 1866 (2010) (describing that 
an early nineteenth-century “practice of securing a determination of the right to indemnity almost 
invariably entailed the submission of a petition to Congress for the adoption of private legislation” 
(emphasis omitted)). For examples of legislation targeted at specific grievances, see Pope v. United 
States, 323 U.S. 1, 9 (1944), which describes legislation whose “purpose and effect seem rather to have 
been to create a new obligation of the Government to pay petitioner’s claims where no obligation existed 
before.”  
 121 See Joanna C. Schwartz, Police Indemnification, 89 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 885, 912 (2014) (finding that 
“law enforcement officers employed by the eighty-one jurisdictions in my study almost never contributed 
to settlements and judgments in police misconduct lawsuits during the study period”).  
 122 This is not a hypothetical possibility. Pursuant to the Federal Employees Liability Reform and 
Tort Compensation Act, commonly known as the Westfall Act, in a suit against a federal employee, the 
U.S. government is often substituted for the individual employee defendants and the claim transformed 
into a claim under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA). Pub. L. No. 100-694, 102 Stat. 4563 (1988) 
(codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.). Westfall substitution occurs even where the FTCA “itself 
does not provide a means of recovery.” United States v. Smith, 499 U.S. 160, 166 (1991); see also James 
E. Pfander & David P. Baltmanis, W(h)ither Bivens?, 161 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 231, 233 (2013) (“The 
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barrier to post hoc fiscal transfers that are designed to mitigate the practical 
effect of a judgment. 
The specific doctrinal formulation of judgment finality, therefore, 
presents something of a mystery. Scholars have previously wondered why 
federal court judgments are obeyed, given that judges (in Alexander 
Hamilton’s familiar locution) possess “neither force nor will, but merely 
judgment.”123 But this misses the point. A more profound puzzle is why 
compliance is not inexorably followed by the entirely lawful exercise of 
legislative or regulatory power to undo the positive or legal effects of a 
judgment. Neither money judgments nor equitable relief in the form of an 
injunction are immune from unraveling, even if predicated upon a final 
federal court judgment and the Plaut rule. It’s unclear why elected actors do 
not engage in redistribution as a second and subsequent step to the judicial 
application of legal rules.124 Even if it is difficult to identify who precisely 
should be paid off as a consequence of a legal ruling, why do we not see 
more rough-and-ready compensating legislative adjustments after litigation? 
2. Abandoning Independence by the Case 
The second doctrinal instantiation described in Part I, independence by 
the case, raises a different set of concerns. Here, worries about the integrity 
of the doctrine arise thanks to the Court’s own failure to consistently apply 
a circumvention principle. This is different from failing to vote in favor of 
judicial independence across its different varietals, on which Part I focused. 
It would be thus irrelevant that only Chief Justice Roberts and Justice 
Gorsuch have joined (in different measures) both the interrogation of 
deference doctrines in the administrative law context, which have resulted in 
a narrowing of Auer deference, and also the campaign to revive the Klein 
doctrine. Gauging the salience of such seeming inconsistency is difficult in 
 
Westfall Act immunity was designed, we think, to apply broadly, displacing all state common law actions 
against federal employees, whether or not such actions seek to vindicate a constitutional right.”). 
 123 THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 465 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (emphasis 
omitted). 
 124 Indeed, this is a standard prescription in the law-and-economics literature. Louis Kaplow & 
Steven Shavell, Why the Legal System Is Less Efficient Than the Income Tax in Redistributing Income, 
23 J. LEGAL STUD. 667, 677 (1994) (“Redistribution is accomplished more efficiently through the income 
tax system than through the use of legal rules, even when redistributive taxes distort behavior.”). This 
prescription is not an uncontested one. Cf. J.A. Mirrlees, The Theory of Optimal Taxation, in 
3 HANDBOOK OF MATHEMATICAL ECONOMICS 1197, 1197–98 (K.J. Arrow & M.D. Intriligator eds., 
1986) (“It is generally agreed by economists that the lump-sum transfers necessary to [accomplish 
perfectly corrective transfers] are scarcely ever feasible. There is no way of obtaining the information 
about individuals that is required except in a society of individuals who are truthful regardless of selfish 
considerations.” (footnote omitted)). 
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the absence of any supervening general theory of judicial independence.125 
The point here is more narrowly that even when a Justice embraces a specific 
doctrinal instantiation of judicial independence, they often do so in a fickle 
and unstable way.  
Taking arguments against Auer deference seriously as a decanting of 
judicial independence would destabilize a suite of doctrines and outcomes. 
But the Justices who concurrently lead the charge against deference in the 
administrative law context have aggressively expanded conceptually 
indistinguishable deference doctrines elsewhere. And they have done so in 
ways that are flatly inconsistent with the Justices’ own articulated theoretical 
critiques of administrative law deference doctrines.126 The result is not just a 
failure to take a principle to its limit, but a flagrant kind of inconsistency. 
To see the force of this worry, it is helpful to drill down first on the 
structure of Auer deference, and then ask whether that structure can be 
observed in other domains of law. As most recently reconstructed by a 
plurality of the Court, the triggering condition for Auer’s operation is that 
the administrative agency has issued a regulation where there is genuine 
ambiguity about the meaning of that regulation in light of “the text, structure, 
history, and purpose.”127 Only then does Auer instruct a court to treat the 
agency’s construction of the regulation as decisive in the litigation context.128 
This deference means that in a private litigant’s challenge to the agency’s 
action, the government is more likely to prevail when Auer is applied.129 
There are two objections to this arrangement. The first sounds in the idea of 
nemo iudex in sua causa—no man should be judge in his own case. The 
 
 125 See supra Section II.A (detailing this absence). 
 126 Even in the administrative law context, the derogation of Auer deference might not necessarily 
alter the balance of interpretative authority between courts and administrative agencies. As Professor 
Aaron Nielson has observed, an agency that lacks the authority to interpret its own regulations may seek 
the same sort of flexibility by simply declining to issue regulations and proceeding by adjudication rather 
than rulemaking. Aaron L. Nielson, Beyond Seminole Rock, 105 GEO. L.J. 943, 947–48 (2017). As 
Professor Nielson notes, the resulting arbitrage opportunity can be constrained by limiting the scope of 
agency discretion available through adjudication. See id. at 950–51. The limited point here is that even if 
Auer deference were abrogated, this would not achieve the ends that the Justices themselves purport to 
advance. 
 127 Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2415 (2019) (plurality opinion). 
 128 See id. at 2418 (“When it applies, Auer deference gives an agency significant leeway to say what 
its own rules mean . . . [b]ut that phrase ‘when it applies’ is important—because it often doesn’t.”); see 
also Aditya Bamzai, Delegation and Interpretive Discretion: Gundy, Kisor, and the Formation and 
Future of Administrative Law, 133 HARV. L. REV. 164, 188–89 (2019) (suggesting that Kisor entails that 
“where there might be a better interpretation but the agency’s view is at least permissible,” a court should 
defer to the agency). 
 129 It is not certain that the government will prevail: the agency’s construction of the regulation might 
conflict with a hierarchically superior legal rule, such as a federal statute or a constitutional provision. 
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second is a concern about an improper allocation of hermeneutic authority—
i.e., a worry about judicial independence. This Article sets aside the former 
concern130 and focuses on the latter, which has become a central attack on 
Auer. 
Administrative law is not the only domain in which hermeneutic 
authority is displaced from the judiciary in a fashion analogous to Auer 
deference. First, consider a case in which an official actor interprets an 
ambiguous law to impose a penalty or a harm on a private party. In response, 
a private party who has been subject to the ensuing regulation or rule (or 
deprivation of a benefit) sues that actor. The official, now a defendant in 
federal court, asserts that her action fell within a “zone of ambiguity.”131 As 
a result of this deference, the private plaintiff is denied either injunctive or 
monetary relief, even though the official’s construal of the law plausibly 
varies (perhaps substantially) from the law’s true content as would be 
ascertained by an unconstrained bench. In effect, the official’s judgment of 
the law has been allowed to supersede the court’s exercise of hermeneutic 
judgment. This combination of circumstances generates constitutionally 
grounded suspicion in the administrative law context, so it should by rights 
also be constitutionally problematic elsewhere. But it does not seem to be 
viewed as an Article III concern. 
Instead, there are a range of circumstances in which an official’s view 
of the law can supersede and negate that of a court. First, in the context of 
post-conviction review of state court criminal convictions, Congress has 
instructed that a precondition of relief is that a petitioner demonstrate that 
the state court’s conclusion “was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable 
application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme 
Court of the United States.”132 The Court has not only embraced this 
standard,133 but it has also aggressively expanded the scope of Auer-like 
statutory deference to reach instances in which there is no opinion drafted by 
a state court in view.134 Deference, indeed, operates even when the state court 
 
 130 There are also reasons for doubting that the nemo iudex principle has the explanatory power often 
ascribed to it. Cf. Adrian Vermeule, Contra Nemo Iudex in Sua Causa: The Limits of Impartiality, 
122 YALE L.J. 384, 395 (2012) (noting the possibility that “for structural reasons there can be no impartial 
decisionmaker in the relevant domain, so that any allocation of decisionmaking authority must necessarily 
violate nemo iudex”). 
 131 See Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2420 (plurality opinion). 
 132 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). 
 133 Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412–13 (2000) (O’Connor, J., delivering the opinion of the 
Court as to this Part).  
 134 See Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 103 (2011) (stating that claims rejected on procedural 
grounds in state court are barred from federal court unless exceptions are met). 
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has adopted verbatim, or almost word-for-word, an opinion that has been 
drafted by a prosecutor.135 Across all these permutations of facts, the structure 
of post-conviction habeas review parallels the structure of Auer deference: 
The state, in its capacity as a party in a suit, receives deference to an actual 
or an imputed reasonable interpretation of the law in a way that forestalls 
federal court correction of the state’s own errors.  
Nor is it plausible to think that the Court was simply unaware of the 
Article III concern flowing from this arrangement. To the contrary, Justice 
John Paul Stevens flagged this concern in an early and important case, 
Williams v. Taylor, about the imperiled “federal courts’ independent 
responsibility—independent from its coequal branches in the Federal 
Government, and independent from the separate authority of the several 
States—to interpret federal law.”136 A surfeit of deference, he warned, might 
be “inconsistent with the practice that federal judges have traditionally 
followed in discharging their duties under Article III of the Constitution.”137 
Despite Justice Stevens’s arguments, the Court has never examined the 
impact of post-conviction habeas review on Article III independence by the 
case. It has simply disregarded the Article III problem when what is at stake 
is not a regulation imposing monetary costs on regulated firms, but a 
conviction depriving a person of liberty or perhaps life.  
Alternatively, consider the operation of deference doctrines in respect 
to assertions of constitutional rights in the national security context. 
Deference doctrines in this domain can also create analogous structural 
conditions that are condemned when they occur in the administrative law 
context. For example, in June 2018, the Supreme Court upheld President 
Trump’s so-called “travel ban,” which prohibited entry by nationals from 
several largely Muslim-majority countries.138 In so doing, the Court 
addressed a religious-discrimination challenge based on the President’s anti-
Muslim statements while in office, while a candidate, and through a range of 
different proxies.139 To uphold the ban in light of these statements, the Court 
 
 135 Natasha-Eileen Ulate, The Ghost in the Courtroom: When Opinions Are Adopted Verbatim from 
Prosecutors, 68 DUKE L.J. 807, 810 (2019) (“Ghostwriting by prosecutors occurs across the country.”); 
id. at 810 n.14 (providing examples). 
 136 529 U.S. at 379 (Stevens, J., concurring as to this Part). 
 137 Id.; see also James S. Liebman & William F. Ryan, “Some Effectual Power”: The Quantity and 
Quality of Decisionmaking Required of Article III Courts, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 696, 873 (1998) (arguing 
that large deference generated a “serious—we think fatal—Article III problem[]” in the context of post-
conviction habeas review). 
 138 Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2421 (2018). 
 139 See Aziz Z. Huq, Article II and Antidiscrimination Norms, 118 MICH. L. REV. 47, 61–62 (2019) 
(summarizing these statements in the context of the travel ban’s implementation). 
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carved out a distinction between the “the statements of a particular 
President” and “the authority of the Presidency itself,” and disregarded 
record evidence of impermissible animus.140 With that evidence aside, the 
Court framed its residual inquiry as a “deferential” judgment of whether the 
policy was “plausibly related to the Government’s stated objective to protect 
the country.”141 
Although the Court’s argument here was ambiguous, the majority 
opinion is plausibly read as applying a deference regime that is in structure 
quite similar to the one employed in Auer. That is, the travel-ban Court did 
not formally derogate the requirement of strict scrutiny normally triggered 
by the presence of animus or a suspect classification. (Indeed, it had not that 
long before applied heightened scrutiny in another equality-based challenge 
to an immigration measure.142) Rather, in the context of immigration 
decisions pertaining to national security, the Court relaxed the strength of its 
review along two different margins. It first set aside the most pertinent 
evidence of animus. Then, it ratcheted down the intensity of scrutiny by 
demanding a weaker form of means–end rationality. The net result was in 
effect to delegate to the government a measure of deference respecting their 
application of constitutional-equality rules in the national security domain 
without derogating from those rules as a formal matter. To be sure, the 
resulting deference concerned a question of law’s application to facts, rather 
than the content of the law itself. But, on the other hand, Auer and its progeny 
lack the overlap of constitutional-rights concerns. 
Recall, finally, that critics of Auer deference castigated the Court’s 
failure to protect those other than “the powerful, well-heeled, popular, and 
connected.”143 The domains into which the independence-by-the-case logic 
has not been extended—prisoner suits and immigration enforcement—fall 
squarely under that reasoning. In post-conviction habeas and in the travel-
ban case, the Court has used deference to disadvantage the politically 
marginalized. Yet in so doing, the Court has been silent about—or worse, 
has abetted—the state’s infringement of judicial autonomy. 
 
 140  See Trump, 138 S. Ct. at 2418. 
 141 Id. at 2420. 
 142 See Sessions v. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. 1678, 1692–94 (2017) (applying heightened scrutiny 
to a gender classification in immigration law). 
 143 Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2438 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., concurring in the judgment). The 
same is true of the public–private rights doctrine. Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462, 483 (2011) (“Article 
III protects liberty not only through its role in implementing the separation of powers, but also by 
specifying the defining characteristics of Article III judges.”). 
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3. When Independence in Gross Fails 
Like finality, the independence-in-gross principle loses force because it 
is amenable to circumvention. Following Stern v. Marshall, the Court has 
allowed parties to consent to non-Article III adjudication before a bankruptcy 
judge.144 Institutional actors have been negotiating structural constitutional 
rules for a long while.145 But with individual litigants rather than branches at 
the negotiating table, there may be “a real danger that the ‘consent’ will not 
in fact be voluntary.”146  
More profoundly, the current doctrinal formulation of independence in 
gross is unsatisfying because it lacks a cogent foundational account of the 
conditions under which it operates. To see this, consider the facts of the 
Roberts Court’s leading precedent, Stern v. Marshall.147 Centrally at issue in 
that case was the bankruptcy court’s power to adjudicate a state law 
counterclaim for tortious interference with a gift, a counterclaim that had 
been filed by the debtor against a third party.148 The putative defendant in 
that state tort suit (who happened to be a creditor in the bankruptcy also) had 
already lodged a state law defamation claim, a claim that was unequivocally 
part of the estate.149 Applying the public–private rights distinction, the Court 
concluded that the bankruptcy court had jurisdiction over the creditor’s state 
law defamation but not the debtor’s state law tortious inference claim.150 
Why distinguish, though, between two state law claims, and classify 
one as public and the other as private?151 After all, both the defamation and 
the tortious-interference claims are quintessential private law matters. But 
rather than providing a clear answer to this question, the opinion slithered 
 
 144 See, e.g., Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 135 S. Ct. 1932, 1939 (2015) (“We hold that 
Article III is not violated when the parties knowingly and voluntarily consent to adjudication by a 
bankruptcy judge.”). In Executive Benefits Insurance Agency v. Arkison, the Court unanimously construed 
the Bankruptcy Code to allow bankruptcy judges to enter proposed findings of fact and conclusions of 
law for so-called Stern claims. 573 U.S. 25, 28 (2014). 
 145 See Aziz Z. Huq, The Negotiated Structural Constitution, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 1595, 1599–1600 
(2014). 
 146 See Monaghan, supra note 37, at 49 n.224. For further criticism of the consent theory of Article 
III jurisdiction, see F. Andrew Hessick, Consenting to Adjudication Outside the Article III Courts, 
71 VAND. L. REV. 715, 731–47 (2018), and Peter B. Rutledge, Arbitration and Article III, 61 VAND. L. 
REV. 1189, 1194–1204 (2008). 
 147 564 U.S. at 469–71. 
 148 Id. at 470–71. 
 149 Id. at 470. 
 150 Id. at 482, 487–88. 
 151 And why find an Article III problem with a bankruptcy judge’s resolution of the claim when the 
same claim could have been resolved by another non-Article III adjudicator with possibly even less 
independence—a state court judge? Notice that Stern’s conclusion cannot rest on Madisonian arguments 
against concentrated power since the bankruptcy judge is selected and overseen by an Article III actor.  
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into circularity. The creditor’s claim, explained the Stern Court, was a 
“federal claim[] under bankruptcy law, which would be completely resolved 
in the bankruptcy process of allowing or disallowing claims,” while the latter 
was not denominated a “federal” claim.152 To explain this distinction, the 
Court reasoned that resolution of the defamation action was “integrally 
related to particular Federal Government action.”153 But the Court offered no 
account of why some state law claims are “integral” to bankruptcy while 
others are not.154 Congress, after all, had by statute placed the debtor’s 
tortious-interference action within the bankruptcy frame.155 Presumably, it 
had believed that there was some bankruptcy-related justification for 
including potentially offsetting claims filed by the debtor’s counterparties.156 
But the Court’s decision conspicuously lacked any coherent constitutional 
account of the permissible scope of Article I bankruptcy courts’ jurisdiction. 
The Court’s failure to offer any justification at all for drawing the Article III 
bound between two species of state law claim leaves the doctrine unstable: 
It is not possible to predict whether and when separation of adjudication from 
the Article III berth will raise judicial-independence concerns. 
The same theoretical gap occurs in the Court’s more recent treatment 
of patent litigation.157 Recall that Oil States concerned inter partes review of 
a previously granted patent.158 The Court found this to be a public right by 
observing that such review “involves the same interests as the determination 
to grant a patent in the first instance,” and the fact that it occurs after a patent 
is deployed in the market “does not make a difference here.”159 To explain 
why, the Court pointed to a statutory “qualification that the [United States 
Patent and Trademark Office] has ‘the authority to reexamine—and perhaps 
cancel—a patent claim’ in an inter partes review.”160 But why was this 
statutory grant of review power determinative of public rights status while 
 
 152 564 U.S. at 487. 
 153 See id. at 490–91. 
 154 See id. at 490–93.  
 155 Id. at 478 (“[The statute] permits the bankruptcy court to enter a final judgment on [the] tortious 
interference counterclaim.”). 
 156 For an economic analysis of why Congress may well have been justified in making this choice, 
see Casey & Huq, supra note 84, at 1218–23, which analyzes recoupment claims from an ex ante 
creditors’ bargain perspective. 
 157 See Oil States Energy Servs., LLC v. Greene’s Energy Grp., LLC, 138 S. Ct. 1365, 1372–75 
(2018).  
 158 Id. at 1370, 1373.  
 159 Id. at 1374. 
 160 Id. (quoting Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2137 (2016)). 
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the statutory classification of counterclaims in bankruptcy was 
constitutionally insignificant?161 
Such pervasive instability about what counts as a private right has 
broader ramifications. Not least, this instability threatens the larger ethical 
ambitions associated with judicial independence. The Court, for example, 
has on occasion intimated that immigration adjudication falls outside the 
scope of mandatory Article III jurisdiction as a public right.162 Immigration 
adjudication, however, plainly pertains to physical coercion and 
impingements on liberty. This seems to fall within the heartland of what the 
leading historical commentary has characterized as “private rights”—a 
“Lockean” idea of “the natural rights that individuals would enjoy even in 
the absence of political society,” which includes “the right of personal 
liberty.”163 A theory of judicial independence whose border is so pliable that 
the physical detention of human beings—often, as it happens, in inhumane 
and appalling conditions164—can be ranked as a matter not concerning “the 
right of personal liberty” is a doctrine of infinite malleability. As such, its 
utility as a safeguard of the rule of law is properly doubted. 
C. The Court as Enemy of Judicial Independence? 
The Justices, it turns out, are fickle followers of their own professed 
aspiration to judicial independence. This Part has emphasized the incomplete 
and internally incoherent quality of the Roberts Court’s arguments in defense 
 
 161 More baffling, the Oil States Court stated that the Patent Clause of the Constitution was “‘written 
against the backdrop’ of the English system.” Id. at 1377 (quoting Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kan. 
City, 383 U.S. 1, 5 (1966)). But if that kind of “backdrop” is relevant in the patent context, why was the 
analogous historical use of nonjudicial magistrates in English bankruptcy ignored? See Casey & Huq, 
supra note 84, at 1168–70 (describing “backdrop” of English bankruptcy practice). Even if one anticipates 
a certain degree of instability in judicial reasoning, the stark methodological divergences between Stern 
and Oil States are startling. 
 162 See, e.g., Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 50–51 (1932) (including immigration among matters 
“involving public rights, which may be presented in such form that the judicial power is capable of acting 
on them, and which are susceptible of judicial determination, but which Congress may or may not bring 
within the cognizance of the courts of the United States, as it may deem proper” (quoting Murray’s Lessee 
v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272, 284 (1856))); see also Ernest A. Young, 
Constitutional Avoidance, Resistance Norms, and the Preservation of Judicial Review, 78 TEX. L. REV. 
1549, 1565 (2000) (“Although the decisions defining the limits of the ‘public rights’ category are 
notoriously imprecise, immigration has long been considered a paradigm example of that category.”). 
 163 Nelson, supra note 81, at 567–78 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citation omitted).  
 164 See, e.g., Dan Barry, Miriam Jordan, Annie Correal & Manny Fernandez, Cleaning Toilets, 
Following Rules: A Migrant Child’s Days in Detention, N.Y. TIMES (July 14, 2018), 
https://nyti.ms/2NQcb0D [https://perma.cc/A79Z-DCRX] (documenting migrant children’s days in 
detention). See generally Ingrid Eagly, Steven Shafer & Jana Whalley, Detaining Families: A Study of 
Asylum Adjudication in Family Detention, 106 CALIF. L. REV. 785, 792–94 (2018) (providing a summary 
of the inhumane conditions in certain U.S. detention facilities).  
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of its doctrinal version of judicial independence as ethical aspiration. Of 
course, the influence of strategic consideration on the Court’s drawing of 
doctrinal lines is “ineradicable.”165 Some loose-fitting joints are to be 
expected in any doctrinal structure. But the Roberts Court’s uniquely and 
pervasively “nonconcessive”166 understanding of judicial independence is 
problematic in a different way, for a close examination suggests that the 
Court has comprehensively undermined its own ethical ambitions.  
What ensues in the doctrine is an embarrassment of gaps, illogical 
limitations, and legal loopholes. For example, the Court has created 
exceptions to the finality rule that swallow the rule. It has allowed and 
amplified deference structurally identical to Auer deference, even as it rails 
against runaway agencies. It has capriciously carved the distinction between 
public and private rights in ways that undermine predictability, and instead 
open the gates to forms of nonjudicial adjudication that are seemingly 
antithetical to the central normative justifications of judicial independence. 
Reflecting on these aporias and their extensions in practice, it seems 
plausible to ask whether the Court has set itself the task of opposing rather 
than defending judicial independence. 
A paradox of this sort, at the very least, calls for further inquiry. When 
it comes to the liming of a basic tenet of the judicial enterprise, such tensions 
are reasonably taken to index some greater strain on that ethical project. That 
is, it is not bad faith alone that explains these results, but rather a deeper 
difficulty in the project of extending judicial independence into the world. 
So, something more than the ordinary dose of the legal realist’s “cynical 
acid”167 is warranted. Some larger explanation is needful. 
III. JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AS A STRATEGIC AND INSTITUTIONAL 
CHOICE  
This Part analyzes the gap between the ethical aspiration to judicial 
independence and the institutional circumstances that must be realized from 
a constitutional-design perspective. Its threshold premise is that judicial 
independence does not emerge or flourish solely by a constitution’s textual 
command. To the contrary, scholars of the U.S. judiciary have underscored 
“the tentative nature of the Court’s creation and initial operation.”168 In a 
 
 165 DUNCAN KENNEDY, A CRITIQUE OF ADJUDICATION: FIN DE SIÈCLE 2 (1997).  
 166 See Estlund, Utopophobia, supra note 24, at 117, 124. 
 167 See Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 462 (1897). 
 168 WILLIAM R. CASTO, THE SUPREME COURT IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC: THE CHIEF JUSTICESHIPS 
OF JOHN JAY AND OLIVER ELLSWORTH 2 (1995); accord CROWE, supra note 32, at 5–6 (emphasizing the 
early Court’s institutional fragility); see also Wythe Holt, “To Establish Justice”: Politics, the Judiciary 
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similar vein, comparative constitutional scholars have noted that judicial 
power and autonomy must be created in the form of new institutions when a 
new constitution is installed.169 In practice this occurs first through a set of 
institutional-design choices and second through a set of strategic choices by 
elected and judicial actors within the institutional-design constraints. The 
ethical aspiration of judicial independence, therefore, is necessarily nested in 
the strategic choices within a constitution’s threshold design and 
implementation. The failures of judicial independence can be traced back to 
the specific choices made in this original process. They are not a matter of a 
recent generation’s fall from grace, but a question of original sin.  
To develop this argument, this Part develops four interlocking claims. 
First, implementing judicial independence requires a choice from a wide 
design space of possible institutional specifications. Drawing on an 
empirical and comparativist literature beyond domestic constitutional law, 
this Article shows there is no one inevitable or necessary way to instantiate 
judicial independence. Second, the Framers’ specific choices over the 
mechanisms to shield independence ex post via salary and removal 
protections—rather than institutional commitments or through ex ante 
design of the appointment process—reflect untenable and now falsified 
presuppositions. Drawing on Alexander Hamilton’s canonical account in 
Federalist No. 78,170 this Article identifies two particularly important yet 
fallacious assumptions motivating those design choices: the constraining 
effect of legal (especially statutory) texts and the general primacy of 
institutional over partisan incentives. The latter deserves special emphasis. 
Although there is ample literature worrying about the “politicization” of the 
appointment process,171 insufficient attention has been allocated to asking 
how the phenomenon of powerful partisan polarization interacts with the 
feasible forms of judicial independence. Leading discussions of judicial 
 
Act of 1789, and the Invention of the Federal Courts, 1989 DUKE L.J. 1421, 1424 (noting “the astonishing 
lack of comment upon the need for a national court system in the period immediately before the 
Constitutional Convention”).  
 169 See generally TOM GINSBURG, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN NEW DEMOCRACIES: CONSTITUTIONAL 
COURTS IN ASIAN CASES (2003) (describing development of judicial institutions across a range of 
polities).  
 170 THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 464–72 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
 171 See, e.g., David R. Stras, Understanding the New Politics of Judicial Appointments, 86 TEX. L. 
REV. 1033, 1034 (2008) (lamenting “the increasing politicization of the judicial appointments process”); 
STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CONFIRMATION MESS: CLEANING UP THE FEDERAL APPOINTMENTS PROCESS, 
at x–xi (1994) (discussing “the many ways in which we damage judicial independence when presidential 
candidates promise to pack the Court if elected”).  
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independence assume away the effect of partisan forces on interbranch 
interactions.172 This Part aims to correct for this tendency. 
Third, given the failure of those two presuppositions, this Part identifies 
three vectors through which elected actors can influence the judicial 
outcomes in potentially normatively disturbing ways (i.e., in ways that are in 
tension with the ethical aspiration of judicial independence). These vectors 
are labeled cracking, packing, and stacking. “Cracking” entails the strategic 
shaping of jurisdiction to undermine judicial autonomy. “Stacking” entails 
recalibrations of substantive law. “Packing” entails manipulation of the 
appointment process. The jurisprudence mapped in Parts I and II can be 
understood as a reflection of how difficult it is to establish a distinction 
between law and politics given the availability of these instruments.  
Fourth and finally, this Article considers and rejects the possibility that 
federal judges’ institutional loyalties can mitigate those partisan pressures. 
Mapping the tension between ethos and strategic action, this Article 
argues, illuminates the conditions in which the Court develops the doctrinal 
forms of judicial independence. Not only does it clarify why the ethos of 
judicial independence seems perpetually contested—not only by judges, but 
also by elected actors173—it also helps explain why the observed doctrinal 
forms are so unsatisfying. Judges choose how to define judicial 
independence in a nexus of partisan and institutional pressures that damage 
the coherent nonconcessive ideal animating judges’ rhetoric. While the 
specific forms observed in the doctrine depend on the contingent conditions 
of ideological and partisan conflicts, falling far short from the noble ethos of 
judicial independence is unsurprising, even inevitable. 
A. The Design Space of Judicial Independence 
The judiciary as an institution is created through a series of choices and 
institutional investments made by both elected and judicial actors, both at the 
point of constitutional design and then once a constitution is up and running. 
The array of strategic options available to political actors after the moment 
of constitutional creation, moreover, is constrained by the choices embedded 
in a constitution’s text. Hence, the range of options during and after a 
constitution’s adoption vary greatly. The Court’s jurisprudence of autonomy 
can be read to identify such independence with a specific set of design 
choices embodied in the text of Article III of the Constitution, and then 
 
 172 Professor Vicki Jackson’s 2007 study, for instance, asserts that “[a] political selection system, 
requiring agreement or compromise between the President and Senate, would appoint those with 
specialized competency in law.” Jackson, supra note 18, at 972.  
 173 See supra text accompanying notes 1–5. 
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imbued with life by judges, presidents, and legislators thereafter.174 But 
concluding that there is only one possible set of design choices at the point 
of constitutional origin is a mistake. Comparative constitutional scholars and 
economists have identified a large design space for the initial textual 
specification of judicial independence. They have further underscored the 
absence of any obviously optimal institutional strategy for installing 
autonomous tribunals. To that end, the leading analyses in political science 
and law highlight the difficulty, contingency, and institutional complexity of 
crafting independent tribunals from scratch. 
Comparative studies of judicial independence have identified a diverse 
array of constitutional-design choices through which judicial independence 
can be realized. To clarify the nature of this choice, it is useful to notice two 
margins along which specific design choices can be arrayed. First, there is a 
choice between ex ante and ex post rules; second, there is a distinction 
between individuals and institutions as objects of protection. The first line 
divides those constitutional mechanisms that operate prior to the exercise of 
judicial power, ex ante, from ones that spring into action during or after the 
exercise of jurisdiction, ex post.175 The second distinction cuts between 
measures that insulate an individual judge from “interference by another” 
and measures relating “to courts and to the judicial system as a whole.”176 A 
judiciary might be independent (or not) depending on whether it can “do its 
job without relying on some other institution or group.”177 Individual and 
institutional independence need not run together.178 Indeed, it is possible to 
imagine purposive cultivation of “second-order diversity”179 by placing 
nonindependent individuals within independent institutions perhaps with the 
 
 174 Professor Judith Resnik has forcefully pressed against this kind of identity. See Judith Resnik, 
“Uncle Sam Modernizes His Justice”: Inventing the Federal District Courts of the Twentieth Century for 
the District of Columbia and the Nation, 90 GEO. L.J. 607, 622 (2002) (“The federal judiciary now 
includes hundreds of individuals who work within the Article III judiciary, who function in many respects 
like Article III judges, but who lack Article III protections.”). 
 175 Notice that both ex ante and ex post forms of judicial independence are inscribed in a constitution, 
and in that sense are created “before” a particular controversy. 
 176 John Ferejohn, Independent Judges, Dependent Judiciary: Explaining Judicial Independence, 
72 S. CAL. L. REV. 353, 355 (1999). 
 177 Id. 
 178 Indeed, in the American context, they don’t run together. American judges are individually 
independent because they make judgments “without fear . . . of (illegitimate) punishments,” but “the 
federal judiciary is institutionally dependent” on the other branches. Id.  
 179 See Heather K. Gerken, Second-Order Diversity, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1099, 1102 (2005) 
(describing second-order diversity in terms of “variation among decisionmaking bodies”). 
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aim of leveraging their knowledge or influence while their individual biases 
are offset and netted out.180 
Across these margins, a constitutional designer can select a range of 
different institutional forms in the hope of instantiating judicial 
independence. In practice, designers tend to employ divergent approaches.181 
At the institutional level, for example, a designer might incorporate ex ante 
a formal “declaratory” statement of judicial independence in constitutional 
text,182 create a compulsory scope of jurisdiction,183 or vest a court system 
with control of its own budget.184 Ex post, a constitution might contain 
restrictions on jurisdiction-stripping, court-packing, or other recalibrations 
of size, jurisdiction, or personnel once a tribunal is up and running.185 A 
similarly ex post requirement that opinions be published also may have 
effects that improve “de facto” a court’s reputation and hence its 
autonomy.186 At the individual level, independence can be promoted ex ante 
 
 180 One version of this possibility relates to increasing the representation of historically marginalized 
groups. Pamela S. Karlan, Two Concepts of Judicial Independence, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 535, 548 (1999) 
(“[I]mpartiality is better achieved by ensuring diverse perspectives on the bench rather than by striving 
for the selection of Chauncey Gardeners and stealth candidates.”). A more recent version, called the 
“balanced bench,” explicitly looks toward partisan identity. Daniel Epps & Ganesh Sitaraman, How to 
Save the Supreme Court, 129 YALE L.J. 148, 193 (2019) (describing, inter alia, a proposal with five 
Democratic and five Republican Justices, and then five additional Justices chosen by the five Democratic 
and five Republican Justices).  
 181 For catalogs of these institutional aspects, see James Melton & Tom Ginsburg, Does De Jure 
Judicial Independence Really Matter? A Reevaluation of Explanations for Judicial Independence, 2 J.L. 
& CTS. 187, 195–96 (2014), and Bernd Hayo & Stefan Voigt, Mapping Constitutionally Safeguarded 
Judicial Independence—A Global Survey, 11 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 159, 163–65 (2014) [hereinafter 
Hayo & Voigt, Global Survey]. 
 182 See Melton & Ginsburg, supra note 181, at 195 (expressing skepticism of this strategy’s effect 
“in practice”). The Tenth Amendment has been described as “declaratory of the relationship between the 
national and state governments as it had been established by the Constitution before the amendment.” 
United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941). 
 183 For instance, Article III, Section 2 has famously been read to make the Supreme Court’s original 
jurisdiction immune to derogation from Congress. See Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Power of Congress to 
Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1362, 1372–73 
(1953).  
 184 See McNollgast, Conditions for Judicial Independence, 15 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 105, 105–
06 (2006).  
 185 See Grove, Origins, supra note 93, at 505–06, 517–19 (describing extratextual norms respecting 
court-packing and jurisdiction-stripping in American law). For a summary of leading theories of when 
jurisdiction-stripping is permissible, see Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Jurisdiction-Stripping Reconsidered, 
96 VA. L. REV. 1043, 1046–47 (2010) [hereinafter Fallon, Jurisdiction-Stripping]. 
 186 Hayo & Voigt, Global Survey, supra note 181, at 165. For a list of American state constitutions 
that impose judicial-opinion-publication requirements, see Judith Resnik, Diffusing Disputes: The Public 
in the Private of Arbitration, the Private in Courts, and the Erasure of Rights, 124 YALE L.J. 2804, 2818 
n.48 (2015). 
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by using a “judicial council”187 or another nonpartisan or balanced body for 
appointments or by utilizing qualification rules. Ex post, individuals can be 
shielded through the procedural mechanisms of removal, a constraint on the 
substantive grounds of removal, and “[s]alary [i]nsulation.”188 This menu of 
possibilities is summarized in Table 1 below. 
TABLE 1: DESIGN MARGINS OF JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE 
 Ex Ante Ex Post 
Individual 
Nonpartisan selection 




Protection from removal via 
substantive standards or procedure 
Institutional 









In practice, most constitutions contain between one and four textual 
elements that tend to promote independence.189 A reasonable selection 
among these options is likely to reflect different estimates of what risks 
confront judicial independence under the specific national conditions in 
which a given constitution is crafted and implemented. For instance, some 
designers might be concerned about the state’s potential failure to invest in 
institutions or personnel up front. Others might be concerned that elected 
branches of government will create an independent judicial body, but then 
experience “time-inconsistent preferences” such that they are tempted to 
interfere with the decisions of judges after the fact.190 The level of expected 
 
 187 Nuno Garoupa & Tom Ginsburg, Guarding the Guardians: Judicial Councils and Judicial 
Independence, 57 AM. J. COMPAR. L. 103, 106 (2009) (“Judicial councils are bodies that are designed to 
insulate the functions of appointment, promotion, and discipline of judges from the partisan political 
process while ensuring some level of accountability.”). 
 188 Melton & Ginsburg, supra note 181, at 196; Hayo & Voigt, Global Survey, supra note 181, at 
166. 
 189 Melton & Ginsburg, supra note 181, at 197.  
 190 Bernd Hayo & Stefan Voigt, Explaining De Facto Judicial Independence, 27 INT’L REV. L. & 
ECON. 269, 272 (2007). 
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political competition within the national elected branches is also likely to 
shape incentives toward the judiciary. Where there is a “prospect that 
[independent courts] will . . . be imposed on [a] rival[] with very different 
policy views,” transient possessors of political power have a smaller 
incentive to renege on the bench’s autonomy.191 Divergent threshold political 
conjunctions thus lead to distinct institutional templates of judicial 
independence. 
Consistent with the variety of circumstances to which tribunals’ design 
might respond, there is no single, universally optimal institutional 
specification of judicial independence. Underscoring the lack of any one- 
size-fit-all solution for judicial independence, a recent global analysis finds 
that after controlling for country-level confounds, “the effects of . . . de jure 
attributes [i.e., in a constitution’s text] disappear.”192 At a more granular 
level, another disconnect also emerges. A constitutional text can be a poor 
index of de facto independence because the latter will depend on how textual 
choices interact with a range of strategic choices made by political actors 
after a constitution is adopted. Japan’s constitution, for instance, declares 
that judges “shall be independent” and curbs removal through an 
impeachment mechanism.193 This might be expected to yield a similar level 
of independence as the United States. But Japan’s ruling party has used “job 
assignments” to undermine the ability of judges to diverge from the 
government’s preferences.194 This assignment power is not addressed in the 
Japanese constitution. This suggests the need to be alert to the possibility that 
extraconstitutional institutional-design choices can be used to undermine the 
textual predicates of independence. Predictions about independence from 
constitutional text, the Japanese case suggests, are fragile against the sheer 
range and heterogeneity of potential confounds. 
Outside the legal academy, indeed, one influential view is that textual 
commitments are never determinative of judicial independence. An 
influential strand of economics research, for instance, associates judicial 
independence not with any aspect of constitutional design, but rather with 
 
 191 See F. Andrew Hanssen, Is There a Politically Optimal Level of Judicial Independence?, 94 AM. 
ECON. REV. 712, 727 (2004). 
 192 See Melton & Ginsburg, supra note 181, at 203; accord Julio Ríos-Figueroa & Jeffrey K. Staton, 
An Evaluation of Cross-National Measures of Judicial Independence, 30 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 104, 105 
(2012) (finding that “indicators of de jure and de facto independence are at best weakly correlated”). 
 193 J. Mark Ramseyer, The Puzzling (In)dependence of Courts: A Comparative Approach, 23 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 721, 723 (1994). 
 194 Id. at 724–25. 
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the choice of a common law rather than a civil law framework.195 Such works 
look beyond the textual specifications of a nation’s courts to make 
predictions about judicial independence based on system-level variables, 
such as the degree to which “power is fragmented and diffused, either within 
or between government institutions.”196 But even these studies should be 
viewed with a measure of skepticism. A tribunal that is “neither autonomous 
nor influential could appear to be both” if it was strategic about the way in 
which it selected cases and decided them.197 Inquiries into such extrinsic 
determinants of judicial independence, in any case, yield scant guidance as 
to which of the various institutional safeguards cataloged in Table 1 should 
be preferred. These theories merely underscore the absence of any one set of 
optimal constitutional design for judicial independence. 
So it is a conceptual and empirical mistake to assume that the term 
“judicial independence” takes a single institutional form. There are many 
ways of instantiating autonomous courts. The empirical literature suggests a 
deep difficulty in predicting performance based on de jure characteristics. 
The constitutional design space of judicial independence, in sum, is not just 
large; it is also largely devoid of signposts. 
B. The Presuppositions of Article III 
The Framers of Article III selected from within this design space two 
ex post, individual implements for the vindication of judicial independence. 
First, Article III provides federal judges with tenure during “good 
[b]ehaviour”198 to protect them from removal outside the impeachment 
process.199 Second, they are protected from reductions in (non-inflation-
 
 195 The leading paper about the role of law in development is Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-
Silanes, Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Law and Finance, 106 J. POL. ECON. 1113 (1998). More 
recent work casts some doubt on this claim. Gretchen Helmke & Frances Rosenbluth, Regimes and the 
Rule of Law: Judicial Independence in Comparative Perspective, 12 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 345, 349 (2009) 
(noting that “common law status is a poor predictor of empirical levels of judicial independence”). 
 196 Lisa Hilbink, The Origins of Positive Judicial Independence, 64 WORLD POL. 587, 588 (2012). 
Compare id. at 589–90 (doubting the effect of political fragmentation based on comparative studies of 
Spain and Chile), with Ramseyer, supra note 193, at 739–42 (emphasizing political fragmentation as a 
potential cause of judicial independence), and Matthew C. Stephenson, “When the Devil Turns . . . ”: 
The Political Foundations of Independent Judicial Review, 32 J. LEGAL STUD. 59, 61 (2003) (stating that 
independent judicial review is “sustainable only when the political system is sufficiently competitive”). 
 197 Ríos-Figueroa & Staton, supra note 192, at 109. 
 198 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (“The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their 
Offices during good Behaviour . . . .”). 
 199 The necessity of impeachment for a judge’s removal has been contested. See, e.g., Saikrishna 
Prakash & Steven D. Smith, How to Remove a Federal Judge, 116 YALE L.J. 72, 129–30 (2006) (arguing 
that “during good Behaviour” allowes judges to be removed through adjudicatory (not legislative) 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
1100 
adjusted) salary.200 The Framers hence implicitly eschewed ex ante 
mechanisms such as nonpolitical appointment channels. The Framers’ 
choice is most famously glossed in Alexander Hamilton’s Federalist No. 78 
essay. This essay not only supplies justifications for the protections that 
Article III does install, but also tenders reasons for the absence of other 
prophylactic measures. These grounds are not themselves elements of the 
Constitution. They are rather what Professor Frederick Schauer called its 
“presuppositions,” or the “extraconstitutional” foundations or cultural 
predispositions on which the Constitution rests.201 The problem is that they 
are deeply flawed presuppositions—and their flaws undermine the 
possibility that tenure and salary protection alone will suffice to establish 
judicial independence. 
A first presupposition evident in Hamilton’s argument concerns the 
constraining effect of law on judicial behavior. An important Anti-Federalist 
line of attack against the proposed constitution trained upon the wide 
discretion it allegedly afforded federal judges. In January 1788, the Anti-
Federalist Brutus described the federal courts as “totally independent, both 
of the people and the legislature, both with respect to their offices and their 
salaries. No errors they may commit can be corrected by any power above 
them.”202 Penned in May that year by Hamilton, Federalist No. 78 responded 
at length to Brutus’s charge of “arbitrary discretion.”203 It resisted that charge 
on the ground that judges would be “bound down by strict rules and 
precedents which serve to define and point out their duty in every particular 
 
mechanisms); Raoul Berger, Impeachment of Judges and “Good Behavior” Tenure, 79 YALE L.J. 1475 
(1970) (similar). 
 200 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (entitling judges to “Compensation, which shall not be diminished during 
their Continuance in Office”). But see United States v. Hatter, 532 U.S. 557, 571 (2001) (holding that 
“the Compensation Clause does not forbid Congress to enact a law imposing a nondiscriminatory tax 
(including an increase in rates or a change in conditions) upon judges, whether those judges were 
appointed before or after the tax law in question was enacted or took effect”). 
 201 Frederick Schauer, Amending the Presuppositions of a Constitution, in RESPONDING TO 
IMPERFECTION: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT 145, 147–48, 156 
(Sanford Levinson ed., 1995) (noting that “constitutions rest on logically antecedent presuppositions that 
give them their constitutional status”); id. at 150 (describing presuppositions as “social fact[s]” or social 
practices that themselves stand outside the justificatory system that comprises the Constitution). Professor 
Frederick Schauer situates the idea of presupposition in a Kelsen-inspired form of legal positivism. I 
eschew reliance on that larger theoretical framework and borrow just the idea of a presupposition.  
 202 Essays of Brutus No. XI, N.Y. J., Jan. 31, 1788, reprinted in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 
417, 418 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981). Brutus was not the only Anti-Federalist to raise this complaint. 
See Letter from the Federal Framer (Jan. 18, 1788), reprinted in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, 
supra, at 315, 315–16 (“[W]e may fairly conclude, we are more in danger of sowing the seeds of arbitrary 
government in this department [the judiciary] than in any other.”). 
 203 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 471 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
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case.”204 Hamilton, to be sure, recognized that ambiguities arise and that 
judges resort to “rule[s] of construction, not derived from any positive law 
but from the nature and reason of the thing.”205 Nonetheless, he underscored 
the “duty” to which judges are subject and the “inflexible and uniform 
adherence to . . . the Constitution” that is expected of them.206 
Hamilton’s implicit model of the causal relationship between the law’s 
rules and precedent on the one hand and the narrow scope of judicial 
discretion on the other would have seemed eminently reasonable during the 
Founding period. The latter was characterized by a widespread belief that 
“judicial interpretation [was] constrained in a way that political 
decisionmaking was not,” and that the law was characterized by only 
“moderate indeterminacy.”207 As Professor Jonathan Molot explains, the 
Framers’ account of an independent judiciary rested on this view of “law as 
sufficiently determinate and legislators sufficiently prescient for statutes to 
be self-applying.”208 Further, there was a “relative paucity” of legislation in 
the Early Republic.209 The absence of a dense thicket of statutory texts—or, 
for that matter, the bushels of regulation to which Auer deference responds—
reduced the frequency of textual ambiguities and related uncertainties in the 
law’s substantive content. Judges in the Early Republic would thus be less 
likely to be confronted with ambiguous legal texts, conflicts between various 
statutes, or tensions between statutes and regulations. Hence, the idea that 
law was characterized by only limited indeterminacy was congruent with the 
observed corpus of law. 
Today, however, the idea that the law constrains judges through “strict 
rules and precedents” is more difficult to credit for two reasons.210 First, a 
 
 204 Id.; see also id. at 467 (“The interpretation of the laws is the proper and peculiar province of the 
courts.”). 
 205 Id. at 468; see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 37, at 229 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) 
(“All new laws . . . are considered as more or less obscure and equivocal, until their meaning be liquidated 
and ascertained by a series of particular discussions and adjudications.”). 
 206 THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 470–71 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
 207 Jonathan T. Molot, The Judicial Perspective in the Administrative State: Reconciling Modern 
Doctrines of Deference with the Judiciary’s Structural Role, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1, 19–20 (2000). Dean 
John Manning has also argued that the Framers rejected the idea that “judges had broad independent 
authority to add to or subtract from the results of that process.” John F. Manning, Textualism and the 
Equity of the Statute, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 57 (2001). But see William N. Eskridge, Jr., All About 
Words: Early Understandings of the “Judicial Power” in Statutory Interpretation, 1776–1806, 
101 COLUM. L. REV. 990 (2001) (contesting the view). 
 208 Molot, supra note 207, at 19. 
 209 DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT: THE FIRST HUNDRED YEARS, 
1789–1888, at 3 (1992). 
 210 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 471 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
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sheer increase in the volume of legal texts generates new opportunities for 
internal conflicts and uncertainty that destabilize this impression. The greatly 
increased frequency of judicial review of constitutional questions since the 
Founding Era also means that a larger tranche of the constitutional text is 
amenable to judicial construction, revealing more opportunities for diverging 
judgment.211 
Second, the legal realist “indeterminacy” thesis has undermined the 
idea that casuistic reasoning alone can stabilize the law.212 Thanks to 
subsequent developments in positive political science, we also understand 
that the Framers did not know how the circumstances of legislation often 
conduce toward vague statutory text that imposes no effective constraint on 
judicial discretion.213 Hence, political scientists David Epstein and Sharyn 
O’Halloran have demonstrated that legislators face a “make or buy” decision 
when crafting statutes.214 Although committees can draft text, members may 
be uncertain of what policy should be and may face high transaction costs 
due to the number of vetogates in the legislative process.215 As a result, 
“making” law through the legislative process can often be more costly than 
“buying” it by delegating to either agencies or courts.216 Because of these 
incentives, legislators press toward statutory vagueness when doing so 
enables them to avoid controversial choices.217  
Professor Sean Farhang has argued further “that courts are a more 
attractive delegate than agencies when Congress wishes to evade blame for 
politically conflictual policy decisions, and claim credit for responding to 
 
 211 See Aziz Z. Huq, When Was Judicial Self-Restraint?, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 579, 586 (2012) 
(charting this increase); Adam M. Samaha, Originalism’s Expiration Date, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 1295, 
1309, 1365–68 (2008) (providing data on the timing of the first construal of different constitutional texts 
by the Supreme Court). 
 212 See Brian Leiter, Rethinking Legal Realism: Toward a Naturalized Jurisprudence, 76 TEX. L. 
REV. 267, 273–74 (1997) (emphasizing the legalistic and doctrinal tools with which the legal realists 
approached this project). 
 213 Indeed, there is a long list of reasons for vagueness. Matthew C. Stephenson, Legislative 
Allocation of Delegated Power: Uncertainty, Risk, and the Choice Between Agencies and Courts, 
119 HARV. L. REV. 1035, 1036–37 (2006) (noting that vagueness can arise due to “the need to leave 
technical questions to experts,” as well as “politicians’ desire to duck blame for unpopular choices or to 
create new opportunities for constituency service, the inability of multimember legislatures to reach stable 
consensus, and the impossibility (or excessive cost) of anticipating and resolving all relevant 
implementation issues in advance” (footnotes omitted)). I highlight only two. 
 214 DAVID EPSTEIN & SHARYN O’HALLORAN, DELEGATING POWERS: A TRANSACTION COST 
POLITICS APPROACH TO POLICY MAKING UNDER SEPARATE POWERS 47–49 (1999). 
 215 Id. at 48. 
 216 Id. at 47–49. 
 217 See Mark A. Graber, The Nonmajoritarian Difficulty: Legislative Deference to the Judiciary, 
7 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 35, 50–51 (1993) (giving the example of the Sherman Act). 
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public demand for congressional action.”218 This “courts as dumping 
grounds” thesis, like the Epstein–O’Halloran make-or-buy model, suggests 
that Hamilton’s model of law as providing defined limits on judges, and 
hence restraining their pursuit of personal policy preferences, is a myth. 
Legislative preferences for claiming credit while avoiding controversy 
induce statutory vagueness. This is in tension with the Framers’ assumption 
that law would provide a constraining leash on judicial discretion. Law, in 
short, is just not what it used to be when it comes to ensuring that judges will 
act in a legalistic manner. 
A second presupposition of the Framers’ conception of judicial 
independence went to the composition of the judiciary and, in particular, to 
the personal character of the judges who would staff the federal bench. 
Across various Federalist Papers, Hamilton supplied two reasons for 
anticipating that only persons of integrity who lacked bias would be 
appointed to the federal judiciary. First, Hamilton appealed to the screening 
function of the Senate confirmation process. In Federalist No. 76, he 
explained that Article II, Section Two, would select for persons of “intrinsic 
merit” and so would work as an “excellent check” on presidential 
“favoritism” and “unfit characters.”219 Hamilton here built on James 
Madison’s idea of “successive filtrations” of personnel through the process 
of representational selection for national office as a mechanism for achieving 
a republican form of government on a national scale.220 To be sure, his point 
encompassed all appointments within the Executive Branch subject to advice 
and consent, but it has a particular potency in respect to the judiciary given 
the Anti-Federalists’ concern of a completely independent judiciary. 
Hamilton then offered a second and separate argument for 
independence in Federalist No. 78. Here, Hamilton proffered a sociological 
argument from scarcity for the quality of the federal bench to quiet Anti-
Federalist unease. “[T]here can be but few men in the society who will have 
sufficient skill in the laws to qualify them for the stations of judges,” 
Hamilton predicted, and fewer still “who unite the requisite integrity with 
 
 218 Sean Farhang, Legislating for Litigation: Delegation, Public Policy, and Democracy, 106 CALIF. 
L. REV. 1529, 1547 (2018). 
 219 THE FEDERALIST NO. 76, at 456–57 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961); accord 
John B. Fowles, Compounding the Countermajoritarian Difficulty Through “Plaintiff’s Diplomacy”: 
Can the International Criminal Court Provide a Solution?, 2003 BYU L. REV. 1129, 1142 
(“[P]residential appointment of federal judges coupled with their ratification by the ‘Advice and Consent 
of the Senate’ [was] . . . meant to place the most qualified and virtuous people into such offices.” (quoting 
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2)). 
 220 JAMES MADISON, JOURNAL OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION 80 (E.H. Scott ed., Chicago, Albert, 
Scott & Co. 1893) (1840). 
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the requisite knowledge.”221 Scarcity of talent, that is, would mitigate the risk 
of opportunistic or pernicious logic of selection either at the presidential or 
the Senate stage. Because it would not be feasible for the President to 
credibly nominate people without “the requisite integrity” for the federal 
bench, there would be simply no room for the White House to inject its own 
policy preferences into the appointment process.222  
Yet again, however, these presuppositions of an independent judiciary 
have proved vulnerable to social change. To begin with the obvious, 
Hamilton’s argument from scarcity no longer holds: There are more than 
enough men—and, happily, women—trained in the law to staff the judiciary. 
Accounting for the range of students attending various law schools, the 
eligible population as a whole is also ideologically heterogenous. Law 
students may be predictably uniform along some margins, but they are not 
clustered uniquely within one pole of today’s polarized political landscape.223 
In light of the democratization of the legal profession, it is implausible to 
assume that supply-side constraints will work as effective determinants of 
judicial independence. 
More seriously, the Framers infamously misunderstood the strength of 
partisan motivations in shaping institutional outcomes at the national level. 
Writing as Publius, James Madison predicted that “[a]mbition [would] 
counteract ambition” as “[t]he interest of the man [came to be] connected 
with the constitutional rights of the place,”224 but it was not to be. As 
Professors Daryl Levinson and Richard Pildes have observed, our national 
political party system “tied the power and political fortunes of government 
officials to issues and elections.”225 They emphasize the extent to which 
“Madison’s design [for the separation of powers] was eclipsed almost from 
the outset by the emergence of robust democratic political competition,” 
even though “[t]he idea of political parties, representing institutionalized 
divisions of interest, was famously anathema to the Framers.”226  
The repulsive force of binary partisanship is arguably on the rise, thanks 
to recent changes to the structure of national politics. In a recent book, Lee 
Drutman has argued as much. Specifically, he has asserted that although the 
 
 221 THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 471 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
 222 See id. 
 223 Adam Bonica, Adam S. Chilton & Maya Sen, The Political Ideologies of American Lawyers, 8 J. 
LEGAL ANALYSIS 277, 291–92 (2016).  
 224 THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 322 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
 225 Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not Powers, 119 HARV. L. REV. 
2312, 2323 (2006). 
 226 Id. at 2319–20. 
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two-party structure was latent in national politics even in the 1790s, until 
recently, the two parties have remained “capacious, incoherent, and 
overlapping” because of cross-cutting regional affiliations.227 On Drutman’s 
account, the present moment of sharp political polarization is a result of 
unification and coherence within the two main national parties.228 He 
suggests that the partisan polarization of the present moment was thus always 
latent in the constitutional design.229 Again, it is not that there is a new 
failure—rather that a problem hardwired into the initial constitutional design 
has become particularly sharply defined now. 
The importance of partisan dynamics to understanding national politics 
is not limited to the United States. More generally, comparative 
constitutional scholarship has shown that “political parties are a key site of 
political competition and a central factor in the relative concentration or 
dispersal of power in [both majoritarian and proportional] systems.”230 
The account of “successive filtration” upon which Hamilton’s argument 
rests is inconsistent with this “separation of parties” understanding of 
American government. The latter, even applied as a description of only the 
Legislative or Executive Branches’ behavior, has important and destabilizing 
implications for the constitutional ethos of judicial independence. Under 
conditions of unified government, the Senate has no incentive to screen 
judicial nominees in the manner that Hamilton predicted. The available 
empirical evidence (which is, incidentally, not confined to the recent period 
of Republican dominance of the Senate) suggests that they do not.231 Indeed, 
historical studies suggest that partisan considerations have been the norm 
rather than exception in judicial appointments.232 Senators, for instance, have 
 
 227 LEE DRUTMAN, BREAKING THE TWO-PARTY DOOM LOOP: THE CASE FOR MULTIPARTY 
DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 2, 24–25 (2020). 
 228 Id. at 25. 
 229 See id. at 22–23 (arguing that the Framers were “blinded by their aversion to political parties” 
and “[h]ad the Framers focused more on factional balancing . . . American democracy might have 
developed differently”). 
 230 Stephen Gardbaum, Political Parties, Voting Systems, and the Separation of Powers, 65 AM. J. 
COMPAR. L. 229, 230 (2017). 
 231 See, e.g., Lee Epstein, René Lindstädt, Jeffrey A. Segal & Chad Westerland, The Changing 
Dynamics of Senate Voting on Supreme Court Nominees, 68 J. POL. 296, 300 (2006) (presenting empirical 
evidence to demonstrate that “ideology and qualifications remain crucial to confirmation politics”); 
Wendy L. Martinek, Mark Kemper & Steven R. Van Winkle, To Advise and Consent: The Senate and 
Lower Federal Court Nominations, 1977–1998, 64 J. POL. 337, 357–58 (2002) (finding support for “a 
political model of confirmation politics”). 
 232 See, e.g., MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, THE FEDERAL APPOINTMENTS PROCESS: A CONSTITUTIONAL 
AND HISTORICAL ANALYSIS 128–31 (2000) (presenting a historical study to show that “the single most 
commonly used criterion for federal appointments is demonstrated personal commitment to a president’s 
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routinely “blue slip[ped, i.e., blocked,] ideologically distant lower court 
nominees even when they are highly qualified.”233 And when government is 
divided rather than united, senators also delay appointments in the hope of a 
more favorable administration being voted into office.234 While there may be 
normative grounds for allowing present policy preferences to infuse 
appointments (at least under conditions of unified government),235 the 
“separation of parties, not powers” model of judicial selection is sharply at 
odds with the presuppositions animating Article III. 
The force of partisan incentives has decisively shaped the terms of 
judicial independence because of yet another key institutional design choice 
taken at the Philadelphia Convention: the so-called Madisonian 
Compromise. The original draft of James Madison and Edmond Randolph’s 
influential Virginia Plan envisaged a national judiciary “of one or more 
supreme tribunals, and of inferior tribunals to be chosen by the National 
Legislature.”236 But opposition led by John Rutledge and Roger Sherman led 
to an abandonment of the idea of constitutionally mandatory lower federal 
courts.237 As a result, Article III “empowers, but does not require, Congress 
to create lower federal courts.”238 Congress alternatively could have relied on 
state courts for many (if not all) of the functions that early federal courts 
performed.239 And in historical fact, Congress did not durably vest federal 
 
agenda”); TERRI JENNINGS PERETTI, IN DEFENSE OF A POLITICAL COURT 85–93 (1999) (describing 
several studies about the importance of political motivations in the selection of judicial nominees). 
 233 Ryan J. Owens, Daniel E. Walters, Ryan C. Black & Anthony Madonna, Ideology, Qualifications, 
and Covert Senate Obstruction of Federal Court Nominations, 2014 U. ILL. L. REV. 347, 351. 
 234 This occurred before the Judge Merrick Garland nomination. See Sarah A. Binder & Forrest 
Maltzman, Senatorial Delay in Confirming Federal Judges, 1947–1998, 46 AM. J. POL. SCI. 190, 197 
(2002); E. Stewart Moritz, “Statistical Judo”: The Rhetoric of Senate Inaction in the Judicial 
Appointment Process, 22 J.L. & POL. 341, 352–54 (2006). Indeed, there is a secular trend of increasing 
nomination delays. See Sheldon Goldman, Assessing the Senate Judicial Confirmation Process: The 
Index of Obstruction and Delay, 86 JUDICATURE 251, 254 tbl.2 (2003) (documenting increasing delays 
in Senate consideration). 
 235 For a normative defense of ideological criteria for judicial appointments, see Christopher L. 
Eisgruber, Politics and Personalities in the Federal Appointments Process, 10 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. 
J. 177, 180 (2001), which flags “a risk that the political character of the appointments process will 
undermine the independence and the integrity of the judiciary.” 
 236 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 22 (Max Farrand ed., 1911). 
 237 Liebman & Ryan, supra note 137, at 715–16 (describing procedural maneuvers that led to the 
compromise).  
 238 James E. Pfander, Federal Supremacy, State Court Inferiority, and the Constitutionality of 
Jurisdiction-Stripping Legislation, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 191, 197 (2007); see id. at 197 n.25 (summarizing 
literature on the Madisonian Compromise).  
 239 Id. at 198 (persuasively developing the constitutional argument for this point). 
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question jurisdiction until 1875.240 The federal judiciary it initially created 
“was understaffed and underpaid, was lacking in courtroom facilities . . . , 
attracted men of little prominence, and had only limited jurisdiction.”241  
In February 1790, when the Supreme Court first convened in New 
York, it was a “sorry scene,” with only four of six Justices bothering to show 
up and not a single case in sight.242 The first Chief Justice, John Jay, departed 
the Court in 1795, explaining that his “efforts repeatedly made to place the 
judicial department on a proper footing have proved fruitless.”243 The lower 
federal courts of that day were little better. Most states had only one federal 
trial judge, and these judges “were essentially authorized to hear only 
admiralty cases plus penalties and forfeitures under the laws of the United 
States.”244 
Nothing, though, comes of nothing. A strand of political science focuses 
on the positive contributions of elected actors and popular movements to the 
construction of judicial power. This work importantly stresses the weakness 
of the judiciary without political support.245 A “vast literature documents an 
empirical association between public opinion and judicial decisions.”246 A 
central finding in the political science literature is that the federal judiciary’s 
effectual authority did not emerge spontaneously or organically from the 
Constitution or even the First Judiciary Act. Rather, it arose thanks to 
“[c]ongressionally driven structural changes and executive-driven 
appointment[s]” that over time “transformed” the courts.247 Especially 
relevant here, this literature casts important light on the way in which 
legislative motives—not only to advance certain policy aims, but also to 
 
 240 James H. Chadbourn & A. Leo Levin, Original Jurisdiction of Federal Questions, 90 U. PA. L. 
REV. 639, 640 (1942) (tracing history). 
 241 Howard Gillman, How Political Parties Can Use the Courts to Advance Their Agendas: Federal 
Courts in the United States, 1875–1891, 96 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 511, 512 (2002). 
 242 See CROWE, supra note 32, at 1–2 (noting the “dramatic evolution” of the Court from its “feeble” 
beginnings to the “prestigious” and “powerful” institution it is today). For a useful overview of the field, 
see Julie Novkov, Understanding Law as a Democratic Institution Through US Constitutional 
Development, 40 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 811, 815–19 (2015), which surveys scholarship that argued the 
Court is “simultaneously a legal and political institution.” 
 243 Letter from John Jay to John Adams, President of the U.S. (Jan. 2, 1801), in 4 THE 
CORRESPONDENCE AND PUBLIC PAPERS OF JOHN JAY 284, 285 (Henry P. Johnston ed., New York, G.P. 
Putnam’s Sons 1893). 
 244 Gillman, supra note 241, at 513. 
 245 Id. at 513–14. 
 246 Christopher J. Casillas, Peter K. Enns & Patrick C. Wohlfarth, How Public Opinion Constrains 
the U.S. Supreme Court, 55 AM. J. POL. SCI. 74, 74 (2011) (collecting sources). 
 247 Gillman, supra note 241, at 517. 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
1108 
place divisive questions off the partisan agenda—catalyze judicial power.248 
A similar analysis has developed concerning the narrower question of how 
judicial review emerged and stabilized. This has been described as an 
“ongoing political project”249 that has prevailed only in “fits and starts” and 
then in unstable equilibriums.250 Scholars working in the American Political 
Development school have thus underscored what Professor Keith 
Whittington has called the “political foundations” of judicial review251 and 
Professor Justin Crowe calls “the historical processes contributing to the rise 
of the federal judiciary.”252  
The absence of constitutional mandatory jurisdiction, beyond one paltry 
high Court composed of fewer than ten Justices, means that Congress has 
exercised a large measure of discretion over when and how to create and staff 
federal courts. And it has exercised that discretion in thoroughly political and 
predictably partisan ways.253 Howard Gillman, for example, has shown that 
the pivotal moment in this development is found in the late nineteenth 
century. In the first half of the 1870s, a Republican Party “special[ly] 
focus[ed] on economic nationalism,” and facing a resurgent Democratic 
Party looking to dominate in national polls, used the 1875 lame-duck session 
of Congress to dramatically expand the federal courts.254 Like the Federalists 
of 1800, that is, the Republicans sought to lock in a measure of policy 
influence in the form of new federal courts. Subsequently, the “political 
project”255 of building and maintaining judicial power has been necessarily 
fueled by partisan motivations of the sort that dominate the elected 
 
 248 Graber, supra note 217, at 36 (noting that “prominent elected officials consciously invite the 
judiciary to resolve those political controversies that they cannot or would rather not address”). 
 249 Keith E. Whittington, “Interpose Your Friendly Hand”: Political Supports for the Exercise of 
Judicial Review by the United States Supreme Court, 99 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 583, 583 (2005) (“[T]he 
maintenance of the judicial authority to interpret the Constitution and actively use the power of 
constitutional review is an ongoing political project.”). 
 250 KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF JUDICIAL SUPREMACY: THE PRESIDENCY, 
THE SUPREME COURT, AND CONSTITUTIONAL LEADERSHIP IN U.S. HISTORY 285 (2007) [hereinafter 
WHITTINGTON, POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS]; see also Huq, supra note 211, at 583 (measuring the 
frequency of judicial review of both federal and state statutes over time).  
 251 See WHITTINGTON, POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS, supra note 250.  
 252 CROWE, supra note 32, at 5–6. 
 253 For an articulation of this point at a relatively high level of generality, see Ran Hirschl, The 
Political Origins of Judicial Empowerment Through Constitutionalization: Lessons from Four 
Constitutional Revolutions, 25 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 91, 116 (2000), which argues that political leaders 
will empower the judiciary only if they have “a sufficient level of certainty . . . that the judiciary in general 
and the supreme court in particular are likely to produce decisions that . . . reflect their ideological 
preferences.” 
 254 Gillman, supra note 241, at 516–17. 
 255 Whittington, supra note 249, at 583.  
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branches.256 Rather than being somehow outside politics, the judiciary has 
consistently been treated as a “potential partner in, rather than an obstacle to, 
[national] governing coalitions.”257 
The shape and extent of the federal courts as a national institution, in 
short, has been thoroughly influenced throughout American history by the 
partisan choices of actors within the elected branches. To be sure, the federal 
judiciary has developed an institutional heft and lobbying instruments that 
enable it to operate as a de facto interest group. But this power accumulation 
merely makes it more difficult for the elected branches to undo grants of 
jurisdiction, personnel, or resources once granted. It constrains the partisan 
foundations of federal judicial power but hardly extinguishes them.258 Rather, 
the political instruments needed for constructing judicial power can equally 
be used to unravel it. 
To recapitulate, the Framers quite reasonably assumed that salary and 
tenure protections were necessary to mitigate elected officials’ excessive 
influence over judicial output. Less reasonably, they also assumed that those 
institutional-design choices would also be sufficient to achieve judicial 
independence. The fragility of their presuppositions about law and the 
selection of specific kinds of people into the judiciary saps the plausibility 
of their predictions about judicial independence. 
C. The Constitution as the Enemy of Judicial Independence 
The Framers’ failed presuppositions about judicial independence mean 
that there is a domain of lawful political action through which the elected 
branches can deploy mechanisms to influence judicial behavior and 
outcomes. The resulting array of available policy tools enable interventions 
in the judiciary’s operations that can compromise judicial independence as 
conceived in Supreme Court doctrine.259 They also allow for interventions 
that are in tension with the ethical ambitions of cabining elected-branch 
authority, protection of minorities and liberty interests, and facilitation of 
 
 256 See WHITTINGTON, POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS, supra note 250, at 127–34 (developing this point 
for the early twentieth century). On the manner in which vetogates in the legislative process have enabled 
political minorities to prevent jurisdictional contractions, hence preserving judicial power, see Tara Leigh 
Grove, The Structural Safeguards of Federal Jurisdiction, 124 HARV. L. REV. 869, 890 (2011) 
[hereinafter Grove, Structural Safeguards]. 
 257 CROWE, supra note 32, at 274.  
 258 See Judith Resnik, Judicial Independence and Article III: Too Little and Too Much, 72 S. CAL. 
L. REV. 657, 663–64 (1999) (discussing the judiciary’s institutional growth and the implements it has to 
operate as a de facto interest group). 
 259 See supra Part II.  
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
1110 
independent judgment on the part of the bench.260 Yet, these vectors are often 
difficult or even impossible for the Court to police through doctrine. As Part 
II suggested (and as this Article will elaborate below), responses in the form 
of constitutional common law glosses on Article III are often either incentive 
incompatible for the judiciary or simply infeasible from an enforcement 
perspective. The result is a gap between the ethical aspiration of judicial 
independence and the circumstances of its institutional manifestation. 
This Section taxonomizes ways in which the Constitution gives the 
elected branches tools to compromise either specific doctrinal instantiations 
of judicial independence or the related normative ambitions articulated in 
judicial doctrine. To emphasize, nothing in the ensuing analysis rests on the 
assumption that there is some a priori definition of judicial independence.261 
Rather, the analysis takes the Court at its word as to the normative aspirations 
traveling under an Article III flag and shows that that the Constitution itself 
renders those ambitions infeasible or extremely fragile under the right 
partisan conditions. Rather than thinking about judicial independence’s 
enemies as external to constitutional law, therefore, this Section presses 
toward an account that sees those enemies as blights arising endogenously 
from the Constitution’s original design. 
To this end, this Section borrows three categories from the literature on 
partisan gerrymandering to classify the most commonly observed 
constitutional mechanisms for limiting judicial independence. This 
borrowing is especially apt because there is a functional homology between 
gerrymandering and the instruments described here. Partisan 
gerrymandering entails the use of formally proper legitimate authority (i.e., 
the power to design single-member districts necessary for first-past-the-post 
elections) to achieve outcomes at odds with a central ethical aspiration of the 
American democratic order—the exercise by voters of an effective choice at 
the polls.262 For judicial independence, the Constitution again supplies means 
 
 260 For invocations of these purposes, see, for example, Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2438 (2019) 
(Gorsuch, J., concurring in the judgment), and Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462, 483 (2011). 
 261 See supra text accompanying note 16 (rejecting that thesis). 
 262 See Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela S. Karlan, Where to Draw the Line?: Judicial Review of 
Political Gerrymanders, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 541, 571–72 (2004) (worrying that “we continue to have 
regularly scheduled elections, but elected officials from both major parties unite to ensure that the election 
results are foreordained”). Even a Court otherwise hostile to partisan-gerrymandering claims has 
indicated that they may be constitutionally problematic. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 293 (2004) 
(plurality opinion) (accepting arguendo “the argument that an excessive injection of politics is unlawful,” 
although not elaborating on the argument’s grounds); see also Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 
2506 (2019) (“Excessive partisanship in districting leads to results that reasonably seem unjust. . . . [S]uch 
gerrymandering is ‘incompatible with democratic principles.’” (quoting Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. 
Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 2652, 2658 (2015))).  
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to the political branch for realizing that end. But, as in the gerrymandering 
context, there is an immanent possibility that the tools will be applied in ways 
that thwart the larger ethical enterprise. 
The focus here is on three such tools, which can be labeled cracking, 
stacking, and packing, but this Article makes no claim that these tools are 
exhaustive.263 In brief, cracking involves strategic design of jurisdiction to 
undermine judicial autonomy; stacking entails recalibrations of substantive 
law to undermine judicial independence; and packing entails manipulation 
of the appointment process. This Section considers each of these in turn. 
1. Cracking 
First, “cracking” involves the exercise of legislative discretion to thwart 
either independence by the case or independence in gross. Recall that the 
Madisonian Compromise vested Congress with ample discretion to change 
the terms on which judicial power can be exercised.264 Neither the courts nor 
commentators have fashioned a plausible outer perimeter for that power, 
leaving “jurisdiction-stripping” as one of the “levers for reproaching a 
wayward judiciary.”265 Such constitutive authority, of course, can be 
employed to seed and then nurture Article III autonomy—and importantly 
was exercised to that end in the 1870s by the lame-duck Republican 
caucus.266 But Congress can also feasibly use the same powers to contrary 
purpose and effect.267 
To be sure, jurisdiction once created is politically difficult to unravel 
because of bicameralism and presentment or Executive Branch resistance to 
such unraveling.268 But this is no surety against alterations at odds with some 
discrete element of jurisdictional independence. In particular, these 
“structural safeguards” have much diminished force during periods of 
 
 263 PARKER, supra note 21, at 48–51 (developing these terms). 
 264 See supra text accompanying notes 236–241.  
 265 Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Judicial Supremacy, Departmentalism, and the Rule of Law in a Populist 
Age, 96 TEX. L. REV. 487, 490 (2018). 
 266 See Gillman, supra note 241, at 512–13. 
 267 This Article’s terminology here is meant to capture instances in which laws have both a purpose 
and an effect of limiting judicial independence. This Article realizes this raises questions of how to define 
a collective (legislative) intent and how to define the threshold for an effect of sufficient magnitude, but 
thinks both these ambiguities are tolerably manageable as the present analytic purposes and do not require 
precise calibration here.  
 268 On the causal relation of legislative vetogates to jurisdictional stability, see Grove, Structural 
Safeguards, supra note 256, at 890. On the role of the presidency, see Tara Leigh Grove, The Article II 
Safeguards of Federal Jurisdiction, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 250, 262 (2012) [hereinafter Grove, Article II 
Safeguards], which argues that “[t]he executive branch has a strong incentive to use this constitutional 
authority to oppose jurisdiction-stripping legislation.” 
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unified government, and especially when a president’s ambition can be more 
cheaply pursued through a diminishment of judicial action.269  
More subtly, the elected branches can use their jurisdictional authority 
to compromise independence by the case without appearing to engage in 
jurisdiction-stripping and can render independence in gross infeasible by 
manipulating the gap between jurisdiction and judicial capacity. For 
example, Congress has enacted a number of important statutes that mandate 
judicial deference to the constitutional judgments of other state and federal 
actors in ways that are at stark odds with independence by the case. In sheer 
numbers, the most important of these are the screening regimes installed in 
the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) for 
post-conviction habeas claims270 and the Prison Litigation Reform Act’s 
(PLRA) exhaustion rule for prisoner claims.271 In the domain of private 
rights, the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) has been interpreted over the past 
three decades to move “cases that would otherwise proceed in the public 
realm—the courts . . . to a purely private realm, which is largely shielded 
from judicial and public scrutiny.”272 The practical effect of the FAA is to 
alienate from federal court review a large category of private rights in a way 
that ought to seem intolerable given the constitutional theory of Article III 
proffered in cases such as Stern and Oil States. 
These statutes (or at least the Supreme Court’s interpretation of those 
statutes) have resulted in derogations from the very forms of judicial 
independence that—as seen in Part I—have been celebrated elsewhere as 
part of the constitutional canon. There is absolutely no suggestion in the case 
law that they are constitutionally problematic. Once again, this Article 
underscores the stark distance between the Court’s embrace and even 
expansion of the AEDPA, PLRA, and FAA on the one hand, with its 
censorious tone in recent opinions on Auer deference or bankruptcy 
 
 269 And to be clear, Professor Tara Grove’s careful and nuanced scholarship does not claim 
otherwise. See Grove, Structural Safeguards, supra note 256, at 916 (“On several occasions, when there 
has been a persistent political consensus in favor of limiting jurisdiction, Congress has successfully 
displaced the inferior federal courts.”); see also Grove, Article II Safeguards, supra note 268, at 309 
(“Presidents may be willing to sign [large omnibus] legislation, and yet permit the Department of Justice 
to ‘oppose’ the jurisdiction-stripping provisions via litigation.”). 
 270 Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254–55). 
 271 Pub. L. No. 104-134, § 7(a), 110 Stat. 1321, 1321–71 (2005) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1997e(a)); see also Van Swearingen, Imprisoning Rights: The Failure of Negotiated Governance in the 
Prison Inmate Grievance Process, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 1353, 1376 (2008) (describing the Act’s 
components).  
 272 J. Maria Glover, Disappearing Claims and the Erosion of Substantive Law, 124 YALE L.J. 3052, 
3054 (2015). For a similar assessment, see Judith Resnik, The Privatization of Process: Requiem for and 
Celebration of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure at 75, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1793, 1812–14 (2014). 
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jurisdiction on the other hand.273 This acoustic separation between judicial 
approaches to the FAA and bankruptcy jurisdiction, for instance, bespeaks 
an impressive juridical capacity for compartmentalization and suppression 
of internal contradictions. One can imagine a constitutional theory that 
would foreclose these impingements on independence by the case or in gross. 
However, such a theory lies beyond the present dominant constitutional 
imaginary. 
One further point is worth drawing out. In the one instance in which the 
Court objected to such jurisdictional cracking, the elected branches found 
ways to undermine the force of its intervention. In Boumediene v. Bush, the 
Court interpreted the Suspension Clause to mandate the availability of 
habeas corpus jurisdiction to detainees housed at the Guantánamo Bay Naval 
Base and invalidated a jurisdiction-strip that had limited such review.274 But 
empirical analysis of the post-Boumediene dynamics of detention policy 
found that the rate of actual releases dropped precipitously after 
Boumediene.275 The cause of this change was “bureaucratic dynamics within 
the executive branch” that generated new and effective frictions on the 
possibility of release.276 Even when jurisdiction is mandated under the 
Constitution, therefore, the elected branches have means to render it a 
practical nullity. 
2. Stacking 
By “stacking,” this Article means the use of substantive (as distinct 
from procedural and jurisdictional) law with the purpose and effect of 
extinguishing finality or independence in gross. This brackets the problems 
of vague statutory text and delegations to courts noted above to focus on 
intentional efforts to subvert one of the forms of judicial independence that 
the Court has embraced.277 As with cracking, stacking arises because general 
legislative authorities necessary for the articulation of a legal system can be 
deployed equally to empower or hobble the bench. Relevant here, Congress 
has broad and uncontroversial authority to make changes to the law 
(including the law applied in pending cases) and to employ its fiscal 
authorities to mitigate the forward-looking effects of federal court money 
judgments. The latter power, at least since the heyday of federal-officer 
 
 273 See supra Sections I.B–C.  
 274 553 U.S. 723, 733 (2008) (declaring 28 U.S.C. § 2241(e) “an unconstitutional suspension of the 
writ”).  
 275 See Aziz Z. Huq, The President and the Detainees, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 499, 534–35 (2017) 
(discussing the decision’s downstream effects).  
 276 Id. at 537. 
 277 See supra Part I. 
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indemnification,278 has rarely been used. But it is hard to see the 
constitutional theory upon which such targeted remissions via defendant 
compensation could be resisted as unlawful. This Article focuses instead on 
the use of substantive law to mitigate judicial independence in other ways. 
Stacking trades on the fungibility of certain procedural and 
jurisdictional adjustments of judicial power with changes to substantive 
regulation that directly bears on private conduct. Congress, all seem to agree, 
can change the “existing law[]” that “each court, at every level” must 
apply.279 Good, practical reasons support Congress’s authority to make 
changes to the law applied in ongoing cases in response to sudden, 
exogenous shocks. Indeed, there are serious difficulties in even carving out 
a distinct domain of retroactive legislation.280 And it is hard to see how a rule 
that prohibited Congress from altering the distributions achieved by a 
judicial opinion could even be crafted: For instance, once a class of plaintiffs 
obtained a certain right to monetary relief, would Congress be prohibited 
from increasing the tax burden of that class (either uniquely or as part of a 
larger class)?281 Similarly, once the power to make changes to the law 
applicable in pending cases is recognized, it can be used equally to unravel 
both finality and independence by the case. Nothing in the Constitution’s 
text, after all, neatly carves at the joint between power to create on the one 
hand and to destroy on the other. 
Worse, there is not much courts can do to respond in the long term to 
these tactics, beyond staccato bouts of one-shot resistance. The reason for 
this is that it is hard to design a rule that singles out all and only those 
instances in which Congress has acted with the intent and purpose of sapping 
independent judgment from the bench. Consider here Chief Justice Roberts’s 
efforts in this regard. Eschewing a motive analysis, Chief Justice Roberts 
recently suggested a “target[ing]” benchmark for impermissible excisions 
from Article III.282 But it is hard to see how such a rule could be effective in 
the long term at protecting courts’ decisional autonomy. Once Congress is 
 
 278 Pfander & Hunt, supra note 120, at 1866. 
 279 See Patchak v. Zinke, 138 S. Ct. 897, 909 (2018) (quoting Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 
514 U.S. 211, 226–27 (1995)); accord United States v. Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 103, 109–10 
(1801); Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 274 (1994).  
 280 DANIEL E. TROY, RETROACTIVE LEGISLATION 20 (1998) (“Retroactive legislation imposes 
economic costs on society by undermining predictability, or the ability to rely on expectations.”).  
 281 Retroactive tax measures with a “legitimate . . . purpose” are treated as valid. Pension Benefit 
Guar. Corp. v. R.A. Gray & Co., 467 U.S. 717, 729, 731 (1984); accord United States v. Carlton, 512 U.S. 
26, 35 (1994) (upholding retroactive tax legislation as “rationally related to a legitimate legislative 
purpose”). 
 282 Patchak, 138 S. Ct. at 917 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
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aware of an antitargeting rule, it has ample incentive to simply write slightly 
broader laws, which sweep in some number of additional cases and hence 
avoid whatever prohibition the Court has set forth.283 A stable equilibrium in 
which Congress has a plausible degree of regulatory authority and where 
judicial independence is formally insulated through doctrinal rules is 
unlikely to emerge.  
That instability in part flows from the third vector of political-branch 
dissatisfaction with an independent judiciary—a mechanism that allows 
partisan actors sufficiently dissatisfied with the courts to utterly reorient 
them, or “packing.” 
3. Packing 
This third possible tactic for undermining judicial independence 
concerns the political (and hence necessarily partisan) character of the 
appointment process. Even if there is currently a constitutional norm against 
court-packing or partisan-motivated expansions in the scale of a federal 
court,284 there is no equivalent norm against the exploitation of legislative 
power over the timing and nature of appointments to reorient the policy 
preferences that the federal judiciary is likely to serve. At least under the 
right partisan conditions, it is quite feasible to “pack the courts” without 
packing the Court in ways that traduce any constitutional norm. Further, the 
Framers’ neglect of informal, social instruments—increasingly powerful in 
recent decades—has also sapped the force of judicial independence. 
The basic point here is quite simple and should not be confused with 
criticism of any particular political party or sequence of appointments. The 
 
 283 For an intimation of such a doubt, see id. at 910 (majority opinion). There, the Court says: “We 
doubt that the constitutional line separating the legislative and judicial powers turns on factors such as a 
court’s doubts about Congress’ unexpressed motives, the number of ‘cases [that] were pending when the 
provision was enacted,’ or the time left on the statute of limitations.” Id. (citing id. at 918 (Roberts, C.J., 
dissenting)). 
 284 See Grove, Origins, supra note 93, at 525 (describing changes to the size of the Supreme Court 
for partisan ends as “out of bounds” (quoting David E. Pozen, Self-Help and the Separation of Powers, 
124 YALE L.J. 2, 34 (2012))); accord Michael C. Dorf, How the Written Constitution Crowds Out the 
Extraconstitutional Rule of Recognition, in THE RULE OF RECOGNITION AND THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 69, 
74 (Matthew D. Adler & Kenneth Einar Himma eds., 2009) (stating that packing the Court would “violate 
a customary rule observed by Congress and the President”). There is an argument that partisan-motivated 
changes to the size of the lower courts would be amenable to parallel criticisms. Richard Primus, 
Rulebooks, Playgrounds, and Endgames: A Constitutional Analysis of the Calabresi-Hirji Judgeship 
Proposal, HARV. L. REV. BLOG (Nov. 24, 2017), https://blog.harvardlawreview.org/rulebooks-
playgrounds-and-endgames-a-constitutional-analysis-of-the-calabresi-hirji-judgeship-proposal 
[https://perma.cc/R4G4-RB3Q] (describing a proposal to Republicans under unified government to 
dramatically expand the federal courts because it “departs from settled norms, and it does so in a way that 
threatens the continued operation of the system more generally”). 
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necessarily partisan character of the nomination and confirmation process 
means each party has an incentive to do two things. First, it will delay 
nominations when the Senate and the presidency are in different hands—as 
indeed the parties have done in recent years.285 Second, when the Senate and 
the presidency are in the same hands, it will accelerate the rate of 
appointments in order to maximize the policy payoff from its tenure in office. 
Consistent with this dynamic, it is in the eras of American government most 
often characterized by united government that the rate of successful 
nominations to the Supreme Court has peaked.286 And as the formative 
example of late nineteenth-century jurisdictional expansion demonstrates, 
this incentive will be experienced most sharply when the party in question 
has some reason for expecting that it will be out of power soon.287 This 
happened three more times throughout the twentieth century.288 That is, it 
cannot be said that such “gerrymandering by personnel” is so uncommon as 
to be safely ignored. It is a feature, not a bug, of the federal judiciary, and is 
constitutionally impossible to banish.289 Today, a body of rapidly 
accumulating evidence showing ideology to be a very good predictor of 
judicial behavior suggests that these structural conditions have deeply 
influenced the character of the federal judiciary.290 
Consider a further possibility. The conventional wisdom is that “the 
President and his supporters in the Senate cannot guarantee the 
‘entrenchment’ of their ideology on the Court in the long, or even medium, 
term.”291 But this may be increasingly not so for two reasons, both of which 
make politicized appointments more likely. A first factor is the rising tide of 
polarization among political elites, which has touched the Supreme Court as 
 
 285 See supra notes 233–234 and accompanying text. 
 286 Geoffrey R. Stone, Understanding Supreme Court Confirmations, 2010 SUP. CT. REV. 381, 383 
(presenting data from the beginning of the republic). 
 287 See Gillman, supra note 241, at 512–13. 
 288 See Stone, supra note 286, at 463–64 (describing periods during the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries “in which presidents from a single party have made ten or more successive appointments to the 
Court”). 
 289 See id. at 466 (“Our government is, of course, a government of politics, even in the confirmation 
process.”). 
 290 Seminal studies include JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE 
ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED (2002), and LEE EPSTEIN, WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. 
POSNER, THE BEHAVIOR OF FEDERAL JUDGES: A THEORETICAL & EMPIRICAL STUDY OF RATIONAL 
CHOICE 77–85 (2013), which both discuss previous studies of judicial ideology. 
 291 Lee Epstein, Andrew D. Martin, Kevin M. Quinn & Jeffrey A. Segal, Ideological Drift Among 
Supreme Court Justices: Who, When, and How Important?, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1483, 1486 (2007). 
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surely as it has washed over Congress and the Executive Branch.292 Indeed, 
the trends are related: Increased polarization in Congress and the presidency 
has pushed up the chances that nominations will be evaluated in polarized 
terms with polarized results. Since 2010, indeed, “all of the Republican-
nominated Justices on the Supreme Court have been to the right of all of its 
Democratic-nominated Justices.”293 Such sorting on the bench is likely to 
conduce to increasing stable coalitions of Justices joining the same majority 
or dissenting opinions and developing over time the same lines of arguments. 
Second, partisan influence on judicial outcomes need not be channeled 
exclusively through formal, institutional mechanisms. They can also be 
transmitted through vectors of sociality. The latter include “ties of personal 
acquaintance and friendship, and of family and party attachments,” such as 
those Madison recognized in Federalist No. 46.294 Social and professional 
networks have important impacts on the arguments to which one is exposed, 
the way in which one experiences reputational costs and benefits, and 
ultimately the choices one makes.295 There is no reason these effects would 
not shape the manner in which government institutions behave; to the 
contrary, social networks and contests are likely powerful influences at the 
aggregate level.296 
Under appropriate conditions, a social network might provide a vehicle 
for the diffusion of partisan influences. Obviously, social networks can 
facilitate the identification of ideologically compatible nominees at the 
appointment stage.297 But this is not all they can do. Social networks can also 
work as a way to “update” the policy orientations of affiliated judges so as 
to resist “ideological drift” of judges away from their initial partisan 
 
 292 See Donald Michael Gooch, Ideological Polarization on the Supreme Court: Trends in the 
Court’s Institutional Environment and Across Regimes, 1937–2008, 43 AM. POL. RSCH. 999, 1032 (2015) 
(finding “a strong linear trend of increasing ideological polarization on the Court over chief justice 
regimes and the pre-Roe to post-Roe jurisprudential regimes”). 
 293 Neal Devins & Lawrence Baum, Split Definitive: How Party Polarization Turned the Supreme 
Court into a Partisan Court, 2016 SUP. CT. REV. 301, 301 [hereinafter Devins & Baum, Split Definitive]. 
This effect arises because of the disappearing ideological overlap between the Court and both political 
parties.  
 294 THE FEDERALIST NO. 46, at 295 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
 295 James H. Fowler, Michael T. Heaney, David W. Nickerson, John F. Padgett & Betsy Sinclair, 
Causality in Political Networks, 39 AM. POL. RSCH. 437, 438 (2011); see also David A. Siegel, Social 
Networks and Collective Action, 53 AM. J. POL. SCI. 122, 122 (2009) (“Across social science, a wealth of 
empirical evidence illustrates the ways in which social interactions can alter choice.”). 
 296 Fontana & Huq, supra note 19, at 59–60 (developing this point). 
 297 See Nancy Scherer & Banks Miller, The Federalist Society’s Influence on the Federal Judiciary, 
62 POL. RSCH. Q. 366, 376 (2009) (finding Federalist Society membership to be a reliable proxy for 
voting behavior). 
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identities over time.298 Politicized appointments become more likely when 
social networks facilitate such updating. 
This second possibility is intimated by Professors Lawrence Baum and 
Neal Devins’s work exploring how partisan networks, including organized 
groups active on constitutional and legal questions, have become important 
causal determinants of the Justices’ policy preferences.299 Professors Baum 
and Devins draw attention in particular to “the conservative movement [that 
serves] as an important reference group” for Justices appointed by 
Republican presidents.300 Networks of this kind provide an effective vehicle 
for the ongoing recalibration of judicial positions. As Professor Amanda 
Hollis-Brusky acutely notes in her path-marking sociological and historical 
analysis of the Federalist Society, “[I]deas are most politically effective 
when buttressed by a strong ‘support structure’—a group of individuals and 
institutions invested in nurturing, developing, and diffusing them.”301 Indeed, 
her work demonstrates the success that the Federalist Society has already had 
as a vehicle for the transmission of (generally politically conservative) ideas 
into judicial doctrine.302 These findings demonstrate how social networks 
fashioned within elites circle can be an effective means for durably 
calibrating the judicial behavior of copartisan judges. (For once this 
technology of influence has become available, there is no reason to think it 
will remain the preserve of one side of the partisan aisle.) These networks 
increase the expected policy payoffs from politicized appointments. 
Moreover, they undermine the Framers’ assumption that judicial 
independence can be defined simply in terms of formal characteristics of the 
kind contained in Article III. 
 
 298 Epstein et al., supra note 291, at 1486 (describing ideology drift through the claim that “virtually 
every Justice serving since the 1930s has moved to the left or right or, in some cases, has switched 
directions several times”). 
 299 See Devins & Baum, Split Definitive, supra note 293, at 360–65; Lawrence Baum & Neal Devins, 
Why the Supreme Court Cares About Elites, Not the American People, 98 GEO. L.J. 1515, 1537 (2010) 
(arguing for “the salience of elite groups” in shaping the Justices’ preferences).  
 300 Devins & Baum, Split Definitive, supra note 293, at 351. For more general accounts, see STEVEN 
M. TELES, THE RISE OF THE CONSERVATIVE LEGAL MOVEMENT: THE BATTLE FOR CONTROL OF THE LAW 
(2008), which analyzes the transformation of the conservative moment, and AMANDA HOLLIS-BRUSKY, 
IDEAS WITH CONSEQUENCES: THE FEDERALIST SOCIETY AND THE CONSERVATIVE 
COUNTERREVOLUTION (2015), which chronicles the influence that the Federalist Society exerts. 
 301 Amanda Hollis-Brusky, Helping Ideas Have Consequences: Political and Intellectual Investment 
in the Unitary Executive Theory, 1981–2000, 89 DENV. U. L. REV. 197, 242 (2011) (quoting CHARLES 
EPP, THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION 3 (1998)). 
 302 Amanda Hollis-Brusky, “It’s the Network”: The Federalist Society as a Supplier of Intellectual 
Capital for the Supreme Court, 61 STUD. L. POL. & SOC’Y 137, 165–66 (2013).  
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4. Conclusion 
Perhaps the most apt question to ask of judicial independence as defined 
and instantiated through Article III of the Constitution is simple: What 
remains? Cracking, packing, and stacking—all contingently available under 
certain political conditions—provide powerful vectors of ongoing partisan 
influence over judicial behavior. They also cast shadows on the judiciary’s 
autonomy that are difficult—especially when it comes to the nomination and 
confirmation process—for the Court to regulate. 
D. Institutional Loyalty as a Shield of Judicial Independence 
But why do judges simply not try harder? To be sure, judges have 
intermittently crafted doctrinal rules to shield judicial independence. As Part 
I showed, these include the finality of judgments, the prohibition on “rules 
of decision,” the Article III mandate for public rights, and (perhaps soon) 
Article III constraints on judicial deference to agency constructions of law.303 
But as this Article has also shown, the Justices have repeatedly proved faint-
hearted defenders of judicial independence. Even when courts have had the 
institutional capacity to push back against political curbs on judicial 
independence, they have not consistently done so. Even if one accepts that 
some measures—packing, certainly, and also some kinds of stacking—are 
difficult for courts to police, there remains a puzzle of underenforcement304: 
Where is it possible for judges to push back, and what explains their 
reluctance to defend their own institution’s interests? There are two likely 
reasons. 
A primary reason is the strength of partisan impulses even for judges. 
Simply put, judges are less likely to resist legislative curtailment of their 
independence when it coheres with their policy preferences. This is the flip 
side of the observation, central to the American Political Development 
literature that the courts are a “partner,” not an “obstacle,” to “governing 
coalitions.”305  
There isn’t any reason to think that the force of partisan incentives will 
abate any time soon. If Professors Baum and Devins are correct that the 
extrinsic forces polarizing the judiciary are growing stronger, with the 
natural result of increasing polarization within the Supreme Court,306 then 
what should be expected in the near future is more selective paeans to judicial 
 
 303 See supra Part I. 
 304 For a taxonomy of reasons, see Sager, supra note 90, at 1217–18, which discusses reasons for 
underenforcement of constitutional norms in terms of “institutional” and “analytic” constraints.  
 305 See CROWE, supra note 32, at 274. 
 306 Devins & Baum, Split Definitive, supra note 293, at 301–03. 
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independence in the body of judicial opinions stapled to yet other deafening 
yet incoherent silences. 
The second reason for passivity is that even when judges act with 
institutional motives in mind, this does not necessarily mean that they will 
resist legislative constraints on judicial independence. Judges concerned 
about docket pressures and the prestige of the federal judiciary may well 
welcome the occasional legislative insertion of a bit or the casting on of 
tighter statutory reins.307 Federal judges, as Professor Resnik has shown, 
complain about being “‘too important’ for certain kinds of cases.”308 The 
relative judicial indifference to the Article III constitutional concerns raised 
by deference regimes in the AEDPA and the PLRA,309 therefore, has an 
institutional foundation as well as a partisan–political one. The Court’s 
willingness to permit legislative foreclosure of injunctive relief based on a 
final judgment may well also be illuminated by a concern about the time and 
reputational costs of federal judges’ involvement in managing deeply 
troubled state institutions, beyond its obvious partisan coding.310 The 
indifference to legislative alienation of constitutional claims beyond the 
purview of federal court, whether through the FAA or otherwise, again can 
be understood as wholly consistent with a zealous concern for Article III 
interests. 
Given the strength of partisan motivations and the ambivalent effect of 
institutional ones, the patchwork approach to the doctrinal formulation of 
judicial independence ought not to be surprising—it is a predictable 
consequence of a federal judiciary whose design and staffing are so 
thoroughly “acted upon by politics”311 and infused from tip to toes in deeply 
partisan orientations and aims. 
IV. RECASTING EXPECTATIONS OF JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE 
The Supreme Court’s jurisprudence of judicial independence is cast in 
what the philosopher David Estlund calls “aspirational” or “nonconcessive” 
 
 307 Huq, Rationing, supra note 107, at 9–10 (noting “the judiciary’s institutional interests in prestige 
and docket management”). 
 308 Judith Resnik, Trial as Error, Jurisdiction as Injury: Transforming the Meaning of Article III, 
113 HARV. L. REV. 924, 972 (2000); see also Felix Frankfurter & Thomas G. Corcoran, Petty Federal 
Offenses and the Constitutional Guaranty of Trial by Jury, 39 HARV. L. REV. 917, 980–82 (1926) 
(arguing that the Constitution does not require Article III judges or juries to determine “petty” criminal 
cases). 
 309 See supra text accompanying notes 270–271. 
 310 See Miller v. French, 530 U.S. 327, 344 (2000). 
 311 CROWE, supra note 32, at 5 (emphasis omitted). 
115:1055 (2021) Why Judicial Independence Fails 
1121  
terms.312 It “states requirements unconstrained by questions about how likely 
it is that they will be met.”313 But whatever uses aspirational theory has in the 
abstract, even its leading contemporary defender acknowledges that it 
“would probably be wrong” to build institutions such that “people are not 
going to comply adequately.”314 Having offered in the previous Part an 
account of the concessions that our Constitution forces upon the practice of 
judicial independence, it is worth asking what kind of normative demands 
one can and should legitimately make of the federal bench, when viewed in 
a more realistic light. 
This Part sketches two answers to that question, in part as promissory 
notes for future work. First, it is possible to disaggregate a number of 
normative claims made on behalf of judicial independence and tease out a 
number that remain plausible. Clarifying which of these claims really matters 
in practice would be a first step to providing a better implementing armature 
for judicial independence. Second, there are certain extrinsic normative and 
even legal standards that can be applied to ascertain whether a given law or 
executive action impinging on judicial independence is problematic. An 
example from the New Deal era casts some light here. 
A first potential response to the clash between the aspirational and the 
institutional dimensions of judicial independence would be to select among 
the plurality of normative ends associated with judicial independence, and 
then to pursue the most plausible of them. Judicial independence, on this 
view, should be imagined as a bundle of loosely related normative goods. 
Some are compromised by the aspiration–institution conflict. Others, 
however, persist and can be pursued even under the conditions engendered 
by the Constitution. If this is so, it should be possible to unbundle the “good” 
of judicial independence, and then to separately abandon or pursue its 
different strands.  
For instance, it is implausible to think that courts will be a consistent 
check on majoritarian legislative preferences. Rather, the dense array of 
vectors of ongoing political influence over the federal judiciary, developed 
in Section III.C, constrain and contradict the libertarian and minority-
protection aspirations intermittently expressed in the jurisprudence.315 This 
 
 312 Estlund, Utopophobia, supra note 24, at 123–24.  
 313 Id. at 125. 
 314 Id. at 132. 
 315 See, e.g., Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2438 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., concurring in the judgment) 
(stating that an independent judiciary “guard[s] the people from the arbitrary use of governmental 
power”); Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462, 483 (2011) (discussing how separation of powers principles 
help protect the individual).  
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suggests that the relationship between judicial independence and the rule of 
law—which is often asserted in legal philosophy but rarely examined316—is 
also contingent and fragile, not secure and stable, at least in the American 
context: Article III courts are not set up to protect vulnerable groups from 
consistent marginalization and subordination. Their ability to prevent 
incumbent abuse of the law is also weaker than commonly assumed. They 
are, as a result, not a complete defense against serious threats to the rule of 
law. Whatever role courts play in this domain should be given less weight, 
and more attention should be given to the role of other institutions or 
technologies. Other mechanisms for defending the rule of law, moreover, 
should be explored. 
A more modest role for judicial independence can, however, be 
imagined. De facto judicial independence (but not formal indicia thereof) has 
been associated in large-N studies with higher rates of economic growth.317 
Consistent with this finding, there is evidence that courts in even the most 
authoritarian of regimes can perform the role of settling nonpolitical 
disputes, say, concerning property and tort in ways that allow the public to 
plan and execute personal and commercial projects. The post-Soviet 
judiciary, to take an especially extreme example, is still characterized by 
informal influence exercised by high officials through telefonnoye pravo or 
“telephone justice.”318 And yet at the same time that “telephone justice” was 
being delivered, most contemporary litigants and informed observers 
believed that most judges gave a “fair shake” to both sides in most 
nonpolitical cases.319 Even in authoritarian regimes in which political 
influence on the judiciary is far more extensive than the American case, 
courts can operate to provide a general dispute resolution function for the 
overwhelming majority of the population. Such a manifestation of the so-
called “dual state”320 suggests that some of the public goods associated with 
 
 316 See, e.g., Lord Bingham, The Rule of Law, 66 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 67, 77 (2007) (describing 
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judicial independence—but not all—can be doled out even under conditions 
of intense political pressures. The reality that judicial independence is 
possible in some but not all cases, even in such extreme circumstances, 
suggests that there is no reason to slight potential benefits sounding in the 
same register in the far less extreme American condition. 
A second potential response to the tension between judicial 
independence as aspiration and institutional fact is to search for alternative 
benchmarks for evaluating legislative or executive incursions on judicial 
authority. Rather than taking some ideal of judicial independence as a 
practical benchmark, the validity of “rules of decision,” jurisdiction-
stripping, and deference regimes should be evaluated in terms of their likely 
impact on first-order constitutional values of democracy, inclusion, and the 
promotion of some notion of the general welfare. Perhaps the leading 
example in the case law of this approach is a Second Circuit Court of 
Appeals’ decision in Battaglia v. General Motors Corporation.321 As glossed 
by Professor Richard Fallon, Battaglia holds that “when Congress can 
validly extinguish a substantive right, it can also strip courts of jurisdiction 
to enforce the right that it has abolished.”322 The relevance of this principle 
here is that it exemplifies a criterion for the evaluation of manipulation of 
judicial power that does not depend on a “nonconcessive” account of courts’ 
power. Unlike the leading approach in the doctrine, it is not necessarily 
subject to the criticisms developed in Part III. Its application, instead, 
depends on the invocation of some extrinsic normative desideratum. It also 
has the virtue of focusing directly on the liberty and limited government 
goals that advocates of judicial independence claim to prize. 
These two possibilities, this Article emphasizes, are merely examples 
(and briefly sketched ones at that). They are not intended to exhaust the field 
of possible approaches to judicial independence given the infeasibility of 
nonconcessive grounds. Both illustrate the way in which a benchmark can 
accommodate the limits generated by the Constitution upon the plausible 
reach of judicial independence. Rather than asking for an incentive-
incompatible ideal, we do better by searching for the feasible alternative. 
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CONCLUSION 
This Article has suggested that the Framers relied on flawed 
presuppositions when drawing up independent federal courts. As a result of 
these presumptions’ failure, elected actors operate in a context in which they 
wield ample discretion to unravel judicial independence of the kind the Court 
indirectly holds dear. Therefore, judicial independence endures (if it 
endures) as “an independent and autonomous institution of governance” only 
as a consequence of “historical processes” dominated by “actors seeking to 
shape the structures of government in order to further their own interests.”323 
Judicial independence’s enemies hence stand in plain sight. These foes 
include the Court and the constitutional text itself.  
Even though the ambition toward judicial independence runs deep in 
American constitutional and political discourse, that term is often deployed 
with an inchoate understanding of its implications. Worse, there is a 
tendency, especially among the Justices, to conflate the ideal of such 
independence with its specific instantiation in Article III. The tendency is 
regrettable, if understandable. Legal analysts, however, should do better. 
They should clarify the relationship between our ethical commitments and 
the obdurate limits of our institutional life. This is not at all to accept current 
patterns of institutional behavior as inevitable,324 but rather to ask how reality 
should guide a ranking of normative ends, from the feasible to the difficult 
to the impossible. It is to understand judicial independence as an ethical 
aspiration that cannot be pried apart from its institutional and political 
circumstances. And it is to attend, carefully and sympathetically, to the ways 
in which our present constitutional circumstances channel and disable us 
from doing better. 
This Article’s account invites a more cautious and nuanced judicial 
approach to what judicial independence can and cannot do. It can usefully 
puncture some of the Justices’ exaggerated expectations of judicial 
independence, occasionally tendered in the heat of the rhetorical moment. 
And it might cast clarifying light upon what is really at stake in political 
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